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INTRODUCTION

"[W]hat Galileo saw in the sky, and revealed to everyone who was willing
to look, was that the Ptolemaic heaven simply would not work. Copernicus's
powerful guess had been right, and now stood open and revealed. And like
many more recent scientific results, that did not at all please the prejudice
of the establishment of his day."'
*

Professor of Law, George Washington University.

1. J. BRONOWSKI, THE AscrNT OF MAN 204 (1973).
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Two people staring at the same "heaven" in 1610 might have
perceived different things: one, the centuries old (and incorrect)
notion that Earth was the center of the solar system; the other, the
realization that the sun was at the center of the solar system and
that Earth revolved around the sun. So, too, two lawyers confronting the same case today might perceive two quite different
things: one, the availability of but one forum and, therefore, one
nearly inexorable result; the other, the availability of two or more
forums and, therefore, the possibility of avoiding the inexorable result of one by utilizing another. Conceivably, that, too, might evoke
"the prejudice of the establishment."
To sophisticated counsel, whether or not to utilize diversity jurisdiction, where it is available, or which of two or more federal
district courts sitting in different states or in different circuits to
utilize, when more than one is available, poses a decision requiring
careful consideration of a number of factors, all related to the
manner in which his client's cause will be favored or disfavored by
the selection of forum. In turn, such a decision by counsel may
impose on the court selected the task of deciding whether or not
the favorable result sought by counsel is appropriate. Surprisingly,
over the past decade there seem to be few cases indicating that
lawyers have recognized that among the factors to be considered
are the Federal Rules of Evidence2 and how those Rules may result
in the receipt of evidence favorable to a client's cause or the exclusion of evidence unfavorable to a client's cause.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, counsel's discriminating
selection of forum may arise in any one of three ways. First, where
diversity jurisdiction would be available and the evidentiary results
achieved by a state court and a diversity court sitting in that state
would be different, 3 counsel will have the opportunity of opting for
or declining diversity jurisdiction. Second, in a diversity case or a
federal cause of action, where different circuits have interpreted
one of the Federal Rules of Evidence differently,4 counsel may
2. FED. R. EVID., 28 U.S.C.A. (1975).
3. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 81 (as to scope of state of mind exception to
hearsay rule); infra text accompanying note 82 (inquiry into religious beliefs to show interest or bias); infra text accompanying note 88 (extrinsic evidence on collateral matter to
impeach credibility); infra text accompanying note 100 (prior statements of witness); infra
text accompanying note 111 (vicarious admissions); infra text accompanying note 131 (effect
of a presumption); infra text accompanying note 138 (statements made for diagnosis or
treatment); infra text accompanying note 149 (learned treatises); infra text accompanying
note 156 ("dying declarations").
4. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 44 (subsequent remedial measures); infra
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have the opportunity of selecting a federal district court sitting in
that circuit whose interpretation is the more favorable. Third,
where a particular Federal Rule of Evidence mandates that state
law shall apply and two states have an interest in the evidentiary
issue involved,6 counsel may have the opportunity of selecting a
federal district court sitting in that state whose choice-of-law resolution would be the more favorable.
In some instances, the effect of the Rules will be apparent; in
other cases, the effect may be less obvious. Whether conspicuous or
subtle, however, the effect should be considered by counsel and the
court. Some of those effects, some conspicuous, some more subtle,
will be considered here.

II.

RULE

501: PRIVILEGES IN DIVERSITY ACTIONS

The second sentence of Rule 501 provides that, in diversity
cases, "the privilege of a witness. . . shall be determined in accordance with State law." On its face, that language would appear to
preclude any forum shopping opportunities, since the privilege issue is to be resolved by state law even if diversity jurisdiction is
utilized. Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee Report indicates
that elimination of forum shopping was one of the reasons for the
application of state law.7 The forum shopping thus eliminated,
however, is that between state and federal courts sitting in the
same state. Significant room for maneuvering remains as regards
forum selection between diversity courts sitting in different states,
assuming that the defendant is vulnerable to jurisdiction in more
than one state.
While it is clear from the language of the Rule that a diversity
court, confronted with a privilege issue, is to apply state law, what
was not entirely clear is which state's law. If the diversity court
finds itself confronted with a choice-of-law problem with regard to
the privilege issue-counsel for the plaintiff asserting that State
text accompanying note 57 (former testimony); infra text accompanying note 64 (state of
mind declarations).
5. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 6 (privileges in diversity cases); infra text
accompanying note 37 (competence in diversity cases); infra text accompanying note 54
(subsequent remedial measures in Tenth Circuit); infra text accompanying note 131 (presumptions in diversity cases).
6. FED. R. EVID. 501.
7. House COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975): "The
Committee's proviso . . . under which the federal courts are bound to apply the State's
privilege law in actions founded upon a State-created right . . .removes the incentive to
'shop.'"
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A's privilege law should apply, and counsel for the defendant arguing for the application of State B's privilege law-how is the diversity court to resolve the problem? Is it free to apply an independently fashioned conflicts rule, or must it resolve the choice-of-law
problem as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of
the state in which the diversity court sits? Put another way, is
Klaxon' applicable? Early on, there was some division of thought
as to whether or not Klaxon was intended to apply.' Subsequently,
the federal courts have concluded that Klaxon is applicable. 10 Consequently, a diversity court confronted with a choice-of-law problem as to which state's privilege law applies is to resolve that problem precisely as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court
of the forum state and apply that privilege law which that highest
appellate state court would apply. As a result, counsel's decision as
to which diversity court to utilize, one sitting in State A or one
sitting in State B, could be dispositive of the privilege issue. A hypothetical case will work to demonstrate the effect of discriminating forum selection.
Let's assume that plaintiff intends to bring a libel action against
8. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941):
We are of the opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, against such determinations by the federal courts, extends to the field of
conflict of laws. . . . Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts
sitting side by side . . . . Whatever lack of uniformity they may produce between
federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to
a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue policies
diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts to thwart such
policies by enforcing an independent "general law" of conflict of laws.
Id.
9. Suggesting the inapplicability of Klaxon were Berger, Privileges,Presumptionsand
Competency of Witnesses in Federal Court; A Federal Choice-of-Laws Rule, 42 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 417, 438-45, 449 (1976); Ladd, Privileges, Symposium on the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, 1969 LAW & THE SOCIAL ORDER 555, 570; Note, Federal Rules of Privilege in Diversity Cases: A Time for CongressionalAction, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1217 (1974).
Suggesting the applicability of Klaxon was Seidelson, The FederalRules of Evidence: Rule
501, Klaxon and the Constitution, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 21, 22 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1978) (perhaps the most influential federal opinion on point); Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F. Supp.
523, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[In determining which State's law of privilege applies, the court
must look to (the forum state's] conflict of law rules.") (citing Klaxon); Union Planters Nat'l
Bank v. ABC Records, 82 F.R.D. 472, 473 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) ("This Court agrees with both
the reasoning and the holding of Samuelson v. Susen . . . to the effect that Rule 501 requires a district court exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply the law of privilege which
would be applied by the courts of the state in which it sits."); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
since the enactment of
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 501102], at 501-23 (1982) ("The courts ...
Rule 501, have for the most part, continued to apply Klaxon.").
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defendant, based on an article appearing in defendant's publication. Counsel for the plaintiff contemplates deposing the author of
the article for the purpose of discovering the author's sources.
Counsel also contemplates that the author will invoke State A's
newsman's privilege" for the purpose of avoiding disclosure of his
sources. State B has no newsman's privilege. At.that point, plaintiff's counsel would do well to consider how his choice of forum as
between a diversity court sitting in State A and a diversity court
sitting in State B would influence the ultimate resolution of the
privilege issue, assuming, of course, that defendant is vulnerable to
jurisdiction in both states (a reasonable assumption if the.publication is distributed nationally)," and that diversity jurisdiction
would exist in either state (a reasonable assumption as a result of
the defendant's vulnerability to jurisdiction in a number of different states).
If counsel brings the action in a diversity court sitting in State
A, that federal court, following the mandate of the second sentence
of Rule 501 and mindful of the application of Klaxon, would put
itself in the shoes of the highest appellate court of State A. Let's
assume that that state court would resolve the choice-of-law issue
as between its local law, containing a newsman's privilege, and
State B's local law, containing no such privilege, by the application
of interest analysis.'3 The diversity court, utilizing that approach,
11. In Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Id. 288, 562 P.2d 791 (1977), the court,
finding that Idaho had no such statutory privilege, declined to conclude that a newsman's
privilege was compelled by the state or federal constitution. The court alluded to such privilege statutes in other states:
Of interest is the Indiana statute which was amended in 1973 to eliminate the previous requirement that to qualify for the privilege a journalist must be employed by a
newspaper having a certain circulation and a five-year longevity. Ind. Stat. Ann. § 343-5-1 (Supp. 1973). See also, Ala. Code tit. 7, § 370 (1960); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 09.25.150-.220 (1973); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1976); Cal. Evid.
Code § 1070 (West Supp. 1976); 11. Ann. Stat. Ch. 51, § 111 (Supp. 1972); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 421.100 (1972); La. Rev. Stat. tit. 45, §§ 1451-1454 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann.
Code art. 35, § 2 (1965); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767-5a (1968); Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. tit. 93, §§ 601-1-602-2 (1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. tit. 4, § 49-275 (1975); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A; 84A-21 (1976); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civil Rights
Law § 79-h (McKinney 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (1971); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1976).
562 P.2d at 794 n.1.
12. Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S.
Ct. 1473 (1984).
13. Here and elsewhere in the article, I have assumed that the highest appellate court
of the forum state would utilize interest analysis to resolve choice-of-law problems. That
assumption will make it necessary to identify the reasons underlying each state's local law
and determine which, if any, of those reasons converts into a significant interest on the part
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would attempt to identify the reasons underlying each state's local
law and then determine which, if any, of those reasons converted
into a significant interest on the part of each state in having its law
applied.
The basic reason for State A's newsman's privilege would seem
to be to encourage reluctant sources to "open up" to newsmen,
thus assuring a more informative press and a better informed citizenry. 4 Assuming that the relationship between the author and his
sources had existed in State A, the basic reason for that state's
privilege law would seem to convert very nicely into a significant
interest on the part of State A in having its privilege law applied.
The basic reason for State B's local law, no newsman's privilege,
would seem to be to protect the integrity of the judicial process in
that state.
Apparently, State B has concluded that having relevant information about the author's sources available in litigation, thus assuring
a greater degree of legitimacy and integrity in the litigation process, is of greater moment than preserving the confidentiality of a
newsman's sources. Does that reason for State B's local law convert
into a significant interest on the part of that state in having its law
applied to this action? Apparently not. Since the forum is in State
A, not State B, the reason underlying the latter's local law simply
would not convert.' 5 As a result, the federal court sitting in State A
and exercising diversity jurisdiction is virtually certain to apply
State A's privilege law and frustrate plaintiff's counsel's desire to
determine the author's confidential sources.
What happens, however, if plaintiff's counsel elects to sue defendant in a federal district court sitting in State B? Again, the secof each state in having its local law applied to the case under consideration. That approach
seems calculated to reveal the propriety or impropriety of the litigation advantage sought by
counsel in making a discriminating selection of forum. Were we to assume simply that each
forum state would characterize the choice-of-law problem related to an evidentiary issue as
"procedural" and automatically apply its own local law, we might lose some capacity to
make an intelligent determination of the propriety of granting counsel the advantage sought
and, simultaneously, overstate the significance of the selection of forum.

14. See, e.g.,

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

184-85 (3d ed. E. Cleary 1984):

The rationale asserted for this privilege is analogous to that underlying the longstanding governmental informers privilege and is exclusively utilitarian in character.
Thus, it is contended that the news sources essential to supply the public's need for
information will be "dried up" if their identities are subject to compelled disclosure.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
15. Whether a state's concern with protecting the integrity of the judicial process in
that state would convert into a significant interest in a diversity court sitting in that state is
discussed in the text accompanying note 16, infra.
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ond sentence of Rule 501 and Klaxon would apply. The diversity
court in State B would be required to resolve the choice-of-law
problem as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of
State B. Let's assume that that court, like the State A court, would
utilize interest analysis. Again, the reason underlying State A's
newsman's privilege would convert into a significant interest on the
part of State A in having its local law applied to this case. What
about the reason underlying State B's local law, no newsman's
privilege; would it now convert into a significant interest on the
part of State B in having its local law applied? Arguably, at least,
the answer may be yes.' 6 Rather clearly, if the action were in a
state court in State B, that state's concern with protecting the integrity of the judicial process would convert. Should it be deemed
to convert when the action is in a federal court exercising diversity
jurisdiction and sitting in State B? I suppose one could argue that
State B's concern with protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state should be limited to state courts sitting in that
state. Indeed, one might even assert that to extend that state concern to federal district courts sitting in State B would be to place
State B in the role of an "officious intermeddler." Still, the argument has a weakness. If State B's interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state were held inapplicable to
diversity courts sitting in that state, those diversity courts confronted with a choice-of-law problem-and ignoring that State B
concern-might very well arrive at a choice-of-law result different
from that achieved by the highest state court of State B. In our
hypothetical, for example, if the diversity court were to ignore
State B's interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process
in that state, the diversity court would almost certainly conclude
that State B had no interest in the application of its local law in
this case, even though the state court in State B would recognize
that the judicial integrity reason clearly converted into a signifi17
cant interest on the part of State B in having its local law apply.
16. See supra note 15.
17. In Jones v. Wittenberg University, 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976), wrongful death
and survival actions growing out of the death of a Pennsylvania domiciliary were brought
against Ohio defendants in a diversity court sitting in Ohio. With regard to the survival
action, a choice-of-law problem existed: under Ohio local law damages were not recoverable
for loss of anticipated earnings; under Pennsylvania law, such damages are recoverable. Recognizing its Klaxon obligation, the court looked to the opinions of the Supreme Court of
Ohio and found that that -court would utilize interest analysis to resolve the choice-of-law
problem. Id. at 1213. The limitation on recovery under Ohio law presumably exists: (1) to
protect the economic integrity of Ohio defendants in survival actions; and (2) to preserve
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Consequently, I am inclined toward the view that at least the
spirit, if not the letter, of Klaxon suggests that the diversity court
in State B should accept the applicability of that state's concern
with protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state.
That, of course, is not dispositive of the choice-of-law problem.
Rather, it indicates that each state, State A and State B, has a
significant interest in the application of its local law to this case.
What had been a "false conflict"'" before the diversity court in
State A has become a "true conflict"' 9 for the diversity court in
State B.
The final step required by this interest analysis is to determine
which state's interest the highest appellate court of State B would
find more significant. It is at least possible that the diversity court
could conclude that the State B court would find State B's interest
to be of greater significance;2 0 if that were the conclusion of the
court, the court would apply State B's local law, no newsman's
privilege, and require the author to reveal his sources. Plaintiff's
counsel's selection of a diversity court sitting in State B, rather
than a diversity court sitting in State A, will make it considerably
more likely that counsel will be able to determine by deposition
the identity of the author's sources.2
the integrity of the judicial process in the state by precluding recovery for highly speculative
damages. Since defendants were Ohio residents, the first reason clearly converts into a significant interest. With regard to the second reason, the court noted that "suit was brought
within the diversity jurisdiction of a district court sitting in Ohio." Id. at 1213. That language implies that the court found that Ohio's interest in preserving the integrity of the
judicial process in that state did convert into a significant interest in a diversity court sitting
within that state.
18. A false conflict exists where only one of the two apparently competing states has a
significant interest in the application of its local law. See, e.g., Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d
216, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1968); R. LEFLAR, L. MCDOUGALL III & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAW 314 (1982); W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 176 (1984);
R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 346 (2d ed. 1980); Seidelson, Interest
Analysis: The Quest for Perfection and the Frailties of Man, 19 DuQ. L. REv. 207, 211
(1981). ,
19. A true conflict exists where each of the competing states has a significant interest
in the application of its local law. LEFLAR & FELIX, supra note 18, at 314; RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 18, at 180; WEINTRAUB, supra note 18, at 346; Seidelson, supra note 18, at
233.
20. Here and elsewhere in the article, I have assumed that the highest appellate court
of the forum state, having embraced interest analysis, has not heretofore resolved the precise choice-of-law problem confronted by the diversity court. I have utilized that assumption
to demonstrate the alternative conclusions the diversity court could achieve and to avoid
overstating the significance of counsel's selection of forum.
21. It is possible, of course, that, if plaintiff's counsel brings the action in a diversity
court sitting in State B, defendant's counsel may have the action transferred to a diversity
court sitting in State A pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) ("[flor the convenience of
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Is there anything inherently wrong with having counsel's discriminating selection of forum so influence a judicial determination
of counsel's ability to identify the author's sources? I think not.
The forum shopping intended to be precluded by the second sentence of Rule 501 is that between state and federal courts sitting in
the same state. Congress did not intend to terminate the pre-existing ability of counsel to engage in forum selection as between
different states. On the contrary, the House Judiciary Committee
rejected the proposed rules which would have imposed federally
approved privileges on diversity actions because the Committee
found that "there is no federal interest strong enough to justify
departure from state policy."2 Consequently, the potential advantage available from a discriminating selection of forum is one
which predated enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
one which Congress, sensitive to the proprieties of federalism, saw
fit to leave intact.
Frankly, were I free to resolve independently the choice-of-law
problem confronted by the diversity court in State B, I would be
inclined to find State A's interest in preserving the confidentiality
of the newsman-source relationship the more significant of the
competing state interests. That would assure that the sources, perhaps influenced by State A's newsman's privilege, would not be
taken by surprise by the application of State B's non-protective
law. However, application of State B's law, frustrating the expectations of the sources, is not likely to be characterized as an impermissible violation of their due process rights for two reasons. First,
in "opening up" to a newsman employed by a nationally distributed publication, the sources could have had no well-based constiparties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.
). However, such a 1404(a) transfer
would require the transferee court sitting in State A to apply the substantive law, including
the conflicts law, of State B, the state in which the transferor court sits. Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Consequently, the choice-of-law result achieved by the transferee court would be the same as that achieved by the transferor court.
On the other hand, if plaintiff's counsel were to initiate the action in a diversity court
lacking venue, and that court were to transfer the action to another diversity court where
venue would be proper, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1976), the transferee court would
apply the substantive law, including the conflicts law, of the state in which the transferee
court sits. See, e.g., Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983):
In the [1404(a)] cases, we must apply the law of the transferor court to prevent parties from seeking a change in venue to take advantage of more favorable laws in another forum. . . . In [1406(a)] cases, however, it is necessary to look to the law of the
transferee state, also to prevent forum shopping, and to deny plaintiffs choice-of-law
advantages to which they would not have been entitled in the proper forum.

Id.
22.

HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973).
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tutional reliance on the application of State A's newsman's privilege. Second, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a forum's
application of its own local law, rather than that of a sister state,
does no violence to either the full faith and credit clause2 3 or the
due process2 4 rights of the litigants (or others) adversely affected,
so long as the forum has an interest in the issue which will be furthered by the application of its own law.2 5 We have concluded that
State B's concern with protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state constitutes such an interest. Further, we know
that, under Klaxon, the diversity court sitting in State B is no
more free than I to resolve the choice-of-law problem independently; it must achieve the same result as would the highest appellate court of State B.
Let's fashion another hypothetical aimed at demonstrating a
similar use of forum selection in influencing the ultimate applicability of a privilege. Let's assume that counsel for the plaintiff contemplates bringing an action for plaintiff-husband against defendant. Counsel also contemplates that, if permitted, plaintiff's wife
will offer testimony damaging to husband's action. State A, the
state of the marital domicile and an available forum, recognizes the
"anti-marital facts ' 26 aspect of the husband-wife privilege and excludes such testimony unless both spouses acquiesce in its being
received. State B, another available forum, also recognizes the
anti-marital facts aspect of the privilege, but has concluded that it
is not applicable when the witness-spouse is willing to testify.2 As23.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
24. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
25. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
26. The anti-marital facts aspect of the husband-wife privilege rests on the concern
that having one spouse testify against the other may threaten the continuity of the marriage. Cf. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980). While many states limit this
aspect of the husband-wife privilege to criminal cases, "[in a few jurisdictions, this right to
prevent adverse testimony is extended to civil trials." G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 89 n.27 (1978). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(a) (1983) ("A
husband shall not be examined . . . against his wife without her consent, nor a wife . . .
against her husband without his consent ....
"); NEv. REV. STAT. § 49.295 1(a) (1978) ("A
husband cannot be examined as a witness . . . against his wife without her consent, nor a
wife . . . against her husband without his consent.
...); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060(1) (1982) ("A husband shall not be examined . . . against the wife, without the
consent of the wife, nor a wife . . . against her husband without the consent of the
husband.").
27. See supra note 26.
28. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 14.306(a) (1973) ("In civil and criminal proceedings, a
husband or his wife is competent but not compellable to testify for or against the other.").
See also United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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suming defendant's vulnerability to diversity jurisdiction in State
A and State B, plaintiff's counsel has a forum selection
opportunity.
If counsel brings that action in a diversity court sitting in State
A and defendant offers wife as a witness, how is the court likely to
rule on plaintiff's objection based on the husband-wife privilege?
Under the second sentence of Rule 501 and Klaxon, the court will
be required to resolve the issue just as it would be resolved by the
highest appellate court of State A. Presumably, State A's relatively
broad application of the anti-marital facts privilege rests on that
state's determination that to permit one spouse to testify against
the other creates an unacceptable threat to the continuity of the
marriage." Since State A is the marital domicile, its interest in
preserving the marriage is manifest. Consequently, the basic reason
for State A's local law converts into a significant interest on the
part of that state in having its law applied. Suppose that defense
counsel argues for the application of State B's more limited antimarital facts privilege. How is the diversity court sitting in State A
likely to react? Presumably, the basic reason for State B's more
limited privilege is its conclusion that, where one spouse is willing
to testify against the other, the marriage is already in such jeopardy that there is little point in being concerned about preserving
the marriage.3 0 In addition, State B believes that, absent a compelling concern about preserving the marriage, the integrity of the judicial process in that state requires the availability of the testimony of the willing spouse-witness. Since State B is neither the
state of marital domicile nor the forum, neither of those underlying reasons would seem to convert into a significant interest on the
part of State B in having its local law applied. As a result, the
diversity court in State A is almost certain to conclude that the
29. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980): ("The modern justification for this privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its perceived role in fostering
the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship."). In Trammel, the Court, acting
pursuant to the first sentence of FED. R. EvID. 501, which provides that in federal causes of
action, "the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience," concluded that the anti-marital facts privilege did not apply where spousewitness was willing to testify against spouse-defendant. The Court found that "[wihen one
spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of
marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
30. See, e.g, Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52 ("When one spouse is willing to testify against
the other . . . their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in
the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve.").
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highest appellate court in State A would apply State A's broader
privilege and sustain plaintiff's objection to the offered testimony
of wife; consequently, under Klaxon, the diversity court would do
the same.
What would happen if plaintiff's counsel opted for a diversity
court sitting in State B? That diversity court, under Rule 501 and
Klaxon, would be required to resolve the issue precisely as it would
be resolved by the highest appellate court of State B. Still assuming the same underlying reasons for each state's local law on the
anti-marital facts privilege, and assuming that State B's concern
with protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state
applies to proceedings before diversity courts sitting in that state,
the court would recognize that State B's desire to protect the integrity of the judicial process, by receiving the testimony of the
willing spouse, converted into a significant interest on the part of
State B in having its more limited privilege apply to this case.
What had been a false conflict before the diversity court sitting in
State A would become a true conflict before the diversity court in
State B. And, given the rather broad constitutional leeway available in resolving choice-of-law issues,31 it is possible that the diversity court sitting in State B could make the educated judicial guess
that the highest appellate court of State B would apply its own
more limited privilege, and, for that reason, apply State B's local
law. Again, it becomes apparent that counsel's discriminating selection of forum may become an influential factor in resolving the
privilege issue. If counsel selects the diversity court in State A,
wife's offered testimony is almost certain to be excluded; if he
selects the diversity court in State B, her testimony may be received. And here, as with the newsman's privilege, the consequences flowing from that discriminating selection of forum would
seem entirely acceptable.
Let's fashion one more hypothetical, one implicating the psychologist-patient privilege.3 2 Plaintiff was gravely injured when his
truck rear-ended a truck being operated by an employee of defendant. The collision occurred in State A. Plaintiff alleges that the
collision was due to negligence of the defendant's driver: he was
operating the truck at a dangerously low speed, without adequate
rear lights, just before dawn on an overcast day. 3 Following the
31.
32.
F.2d 90
33.

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
This hypothetical is based on the facts of Elliott v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406
(7th Cir. 1969).
Those were the allegations of negligence in Elliott. Id. at 91-92.
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collision, plaintiff spent months as a patient in a rehabilitation
center in State B where he received instruction and practice in living with his permanent impairments." When admitted to the
center, plaintiff was interviewed by a psychologist employed by the
center. The purpose of the interview was to assign plaintiff to an
appropriate rehabilitation group. During the interview, plaintiff acknowledged responsibility for the collision.3 5 That acknowledgment
was germane to the psychologist's function. Obviously, plaintiff's
counsel would like to be able to exclude the psychologist's testimony as to plaintiff's admission. Defendant is vulnerable to diversity jurisdiction in State A and State B. State A has no psychologist-patient privilege. State B recognizes such a privilege and
provides that it may be waived only by the express consent of the
36
patient.
If counsel brings the action in a diversity court sitting in State
A, how will the court rule on plaintiffs objection to the psychologist's testimony? Under Rule 501 and Klaxon, the court will put
itself in the shoes of the highest appellate court of State A. State
A's local law, containing no psychologist-patient privilege, probably is the result of State A conclusions that (1) such a relationship
requires no evidentiary privilege, and (2) the integrity of the judicial process in State A requires the availability of any relevant
communications made in such a relationship. Because the psychologist-patient relationship existed in State B, the first reason for
State A's local law probably would not convert into a significant
interest on the part of State A in having its law applied. However,
because State A is the forum state (and still assuming that the
state's concern with judicial integrity applies to diversity courts
sitting in that state), the second reason for its local law would convert. The psychologist's testimony could be a significant factor in
assuring the legitimacy and integrity of the judicial result obtained. Therefore, State A would have a significant interest in having its local law, no psychologist-patient privilege, applied to this
case.
34. In Elliott, plaintiff spent six months at the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago. Id.
at 93.
35. "Elliott had said something to the effect that he assumed responsibility for the
accident ....
" Id.
36. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 5306(4) (Smith-Hurd 1979): "No psychologist
shall disclose any information he may have acquired from persons consulting him in his
professional capacity, necessary to enable him to render services in his professional capacity,
to such persons except only . . . with the expressed consent of the client.
... Id.
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State B, the situs of the psychologist-patient relationship, recognizes the privilege. Presumably, that is because State B is sensitive
to the significance of encouraging the patient to offer the psychologist full and candid information relevant to the relationship, thus
better enabling the psychologist to perform his function. Since
State B was the situs of the relationship, that underlying reason
for its privilege law converts into a significant interest on the part
of State B in having its privilege law applied.
Consequently, the diversity court sitting in State A would recognize that it was confronted with a true conflict: each state has a
significant interest in the application of its own local law. That
would require the diversity court to make an educated judicial
guess as to which state's interest the highest court of State A
would find more significant. Were I free to resolve the choice-oflaw problem independently, I would be inclined to find State B's
interest more significant. Because that is where the relationship
existed, plaintiff, in offering candor to the psychologist, could have
been relying on that state's privilege law. I would be reluctant to
frustrate the plaintiff-patient's expectation that his communication would be privileged. Were the diversity court in State A free
to resolve the choice-of-law problem independently, it might or
might not be similarly inclined. Under Klaxon, however, the diversity court would be compelled to achieve that result it predicts
would be achieved by the highest appellate court of State A. Since
each state has a significant interest in the application of its own
local law, constitutionally the State A court would be free to apply
either state's law. Therefore, it is at least possible that the diversity court's educated judicial guess would lead to the application of
State A's law, and plaintiff's objection to the psychologist's offered
testimony would be overruled.
Let's assume now that plaintiff's counsel brings the action in a
diversity court sitting in State B. How is that court likely to react
to plaintiff's objection? Neither of State A's reasons for nonrecognition of the privilege would convert into a significant interest on
the part of that state in having its local law apply. Because State A
was not the situs of the relationship, its conclusion that the relationship did not require an evidentiary privilege would be irrelevant. Because State A was not the forum, its concern with protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state would likewise
be irrelevant. Since State B was the situs of the relationship, its
conclusion that the relationship requires the protection of a privilege obviously converts into a significant interest on the part of
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State B in having its privilege law applied. Consequently, the diversity court in State B would recognize that it had a false conflict:
only one state, State B, has a significant interest in the application
of its local law. To a virtual certainty, the diversity court would
conclude that the highest appellate court of State B would apply
its own privilege law. Under Klaxon, the diversity court would
achieve the same result and plaintiff's objection to the offered testimony of the psychologist would be sustained. If plaintiff's counsel
utilized the diversity court in State A, his objection to the damaging testimony might be overruled; if he utilizes the diversity court
in State B, his objection to that testimony is almost certain to be
sustained.
It becomes apparent that, notwithstanding its requirement that
state law be applied to privilege issues in diversity cases, the second sentence of Rule 501 affords counsel ample latitude in making
a discriminating selection of forum as between diversity courts sitting in different states. Such a discriminating selection may well
prove dispositive of the privilege issue.
III.

RULE

601:

COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES IN DIVERSITY ACTIONS

In a manner analogous to the second sentence of Rule 501, the
second sentence of Rule 601 provides that, in diversity actions,
"the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance
with State law."'37 As with Rule 501, the House Judiciary Committee concluded with regard to Rule 601 that there was an "absence
of a compelling federal interest" 38 to justify "overturn[ing]" 3 9
"State policy''40 governing the competency of witnesses in diversity
actions. Since state law is to determine competency in a diversity
court, the opportunity for forum selection as between state and
federal courts sitting in the same state is precluded. As with Rule
501, however, nothing in Rule 601 would preclude counsel from
making a discriminating selection of forum as between diversity
courts sitting in different states. And, presumably, as is the case
with Rule 501, a diversity court finding itself confronted with a
choice-of-law problem as to which state's law of competency
should apply, would be required by the second sentence of Rule
601 to resolve that choice-of-law problem precisely as it would be
37. FED. R. EvID. 601.
38. House Comm. on the Judiciary Rep. No. 93-650, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 9 (1973).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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resolved by the highest appellate court of the state in which the
diversity court sits.' Let's fashion such a problem.
Counsel for the plaintiff contemplates suing decedent's estate on
a cause of action that arose during decedent's lifetime. In order to
make a legally sufficient case, plaintiff's testimony as to the facts
surrounding:the cause of action will have to be received in evidence. State A, the state in which decedent's estate is being probated and where diversity jurisdiction would be available, has a
dead man's act 4 2 which would render plaintiff incompetent to testify to matters occurring before decedent's death. State B, where
an ancillary administrator of the estate could be appointed 4 and
41. The identity of the language used in the two Rules compels that conclusion. Rule
501 provides that "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness . . .
shall be determined in accordance with State law." FED. R. EvID. 501. Rule 601 provides that
"in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law." FED. R. EVID. 601.
42. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5933 (Purdon 1976).
See also MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at 159-60:
[Sitatutes in many states provide that the common law disqualification of parties and
interested persons is abolished, except that they remain disqualified to testify concerning a transaction or communication with a person since deceased in a suit prosecuted or defended by the executor or administrator of the decedent. . . . The practical consequences of these statutes is that if a survivor has rendered services,
furnished goods or lent money to a man whom he trusted, without an outside witness
or admissible written evidence, he is helpless if the other dies and the representative
of his estate declines to pay. The survivor's mouth may even be closed in an action
arising from a fatal automobile collision, or in a suit upon a note or an account which
the survivor paid in cash without taking a receipt.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
For an example of a diversity case involving a dead man's act, decided prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Hart v. Friedman, 29 F.R.D. 2 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
43. See T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS § 106, p. 585 (2d ed. 1953) ("[I]n the interests of
creditors or other interested parties administration will ordinarily . . . be granted in any
nondomiciliary jurisdiction where the decedent left property and where some interested person applies. The nondomiciliary administrator is called ancillary as distinguished from the
principal or domicilliary administration.").
See also SMITH'S REVIEW SERIES, WILLS, TRUST, PROBATE, ADMINISTRATION AND THE FIDUCIARY 203 (3d ed. 1982) ("The principal purpose of ancillary administration is to assure the
payment of debts of the decedent to the local creditors . . . . The ancillary administrator's
duties are to: (a) collect decedent's assets, (b) pay the local creditors, and (c) distribute the
remaining assets to the domiciliary personal representative.").
The same evidentiary problem could arise in the forum state even absent the appointment of an ancillary administrator in that state. If the decedent, during his lifetime, had
generated minimum contacts with the forum state and the cause of action asserted against
the decedent's estate arose out of those contacts, the principal administrator could be vulnerable to jurisdiction in the forum state, and the forum state might exercise such jurisdiction even absent any estate property in that state. Cf. Crosson v. Conlee, 745 F.2d 897 (4th
Cir. 1984).
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where diversity jurisdiction would be possible, has no dead man's
act. How will the admissibility of plaintiff's testimony, and, therefore, the legal sufficiency of his case, be influenced by counsel's selection of forum?
If counsel sues in a diversity court sitting in State A, defendant
will attempt to seal the plaintiff's lips as to events occurring prior
to decedent's death by asserting State A's dead man's act. Placing
itself in the shoes of the highest appellate court of State A (and
assuming that court uses interest analysis), the diversity court is
likely to recognize that State A's dead man's act has two closely
related purposes: (1) to protect decedents' estates and the beneficiaries of those estates from claims asserted by claimants aware of
decedents' inability to rebut those claims, and (2) to protect the
integrity of the judicial process in State A by eliminating the opportunity of potentially perjurious testimony by claimants aware of
decedent's inability to controvert such testimony. Since decedent's
estate is being probated in State A and, at least presumptively, the
estate beneficiaries reside there, the first reason for that state's
dead man's act converts into a significant interest on the part of
State A in having the act applied. Since State A is the forum state,
the second reason for the act would also convert (still assuming the
applicability of such a judicial integrity reason to diversity actions
in that state). State B has no dead man's act. Presumably, two
intimately related reasons for that decision of State B exist: (1)
apparently, State B believes that its judges and, where appropriate, juries are as able to distinguish between legitimate and spurious claims against decedents' estates as they are in other cases,
and (2) State B believes that the integrity of its judicial process
requires the admissibility of the relevant testimony of parties having a litigation interest adverse to decedents' estates. Because
State B is not the forum state, neither of those reasons would convert into a significant interest on the part of State B in having its
local law applied. The diversity court sitting in State A would recognize that it had a false conflict: State A would be the only state
with a significant interest in the application of its law. Therefore,
the diversity court would conclude that the highest court of State
A would apply its dead man's act; consequently, the diversity court
would apply that law, the estate's objection would be sustained,
and plaintiff's claim dismissed.
Now let's see what happens if plaintiff's counsel sues in a diversity court sitting in State B. The first reason underlying State A's
dead man's act, protecting decedent's estate and the estate benefi-
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ciaries, would still convert into a significant interest on the part of
State A in having its law applied. But now that State B is the forum state, each of the reasons underlying its local law, no dead
man's act, would also convert. What had been a false conflict
before the diversity court in State A would now be a true conflict
in the diversity court in State B. By constitutional definition, the
highest appellate State B court, and, therefore, the diversity court
sitting in State B, would be free to apply either state's local law. It
is possible, then, that the diversity court in State B could make the
educated guess that the highest State B court would apply its own
local law. In that case, the diversity court would apply State B's
law, overrule the estate's objection, and plaintiff's case would be
legally sufficient.
It becomes apparent that, notwithstanding Rule 601's mandate
that state competency law is to apply in diversity cases, counsel's
discriminating selection of one of two available diversity courts sitting in different states may be dispositive of a competency objection. As with Rule 501, the forum shopping to be precluded is that
between state and federal courts sitting in the same state. Discriminating forum selection as between diversity courts sitting in different states continues to be available and, quite properly, to be potentially determinative of a competency issue under the second
sentence of Rule 601.
IV.

RULE

407 AND SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES

Rule 407 provides that "[w]hen, after an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event."4 4 The policy reason underlying the Rule is that "of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from
taking, steps in furtherance of added safety. ' 4 Most of the circuits
have held that Rule 407's exclusion of subsequent remedial measures is applicable to strict liability cases, as well as to negligence
actions." At least one circuit, the Eighth, has held to the contrary,
44.

FED. R. EVID. 407.

45. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
46. Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.
1983). The Grenada opinion cited cases from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and
Seventh Circuits excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures, id. at 887, and the
court in Grenada arrived at the same result. Subsequently, in Alexander v. Conveyors &
Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit, citing Grenada,
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concluding that the product manufacturer's economic self-interest
will motivate the manufacturer to make product improvements
even if those changes are admissible against the manufacturer in
actions arising out of pre-change product use.47 Rather clearly,
plaintiff's counsel in a strict liability action, desirous of having
such subsequent product changes received in evidence, would do
well to bring the action in a diversity court within the Eighth Circuit, assuming that defendant is there vulnerable to jurisdiction,
rather than in a diversity court sitting in one of the other circuits
where such evidence would be excluded.
That opportunity for forum selection strikes me as being inappropriate. While the language of Rule 407 may not explicitly indicate its applicability to strict liability cases, I am inclined to believe that such applicability was the intent of Congress.48 Whatever
the congressional intent on that point, however, it is clear that
Congress intended that the same Rule and the same interpretation
of that Rule be applied in all the circuits. That suggests to me that
proper judicial circumspection should lead those courts applying
the distinctly minority view to abandon that view and embrace the
majority view, thus effecting the uniformity desired by Congress.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court should accept the first opportunity to rule on the issue, thus eliminating the disparity in application of the Rule. Until such uniformity is achieved, however, counsel will retain the capacity, where diverse citizenship and
affirmed the trial court's exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a strict

liability case.
47. Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980); Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562
F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th
Cir. 1977).
See also DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222, 228 (8th Cir. 1983): "[Tlhe 'public
policy' assumption justifying [Rule 4071-that modifications would not be made in the absence of the rule-is invalid in products liability actions because the manufacturer of massproduced goods is motivated by economic self-interest to make the product safer." Id. In
DeLuryea, the Eighth Circuit applied Rule 407 to a product liability case involving a pharmaceutical product and an allegedly inadequate warning, because, in those circumstances,
"the standards for liability under strict liability and negligence are essentially the same." Id.
at 229. Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed its general conclusion that Rule 407 is
inapplicable to strict liability cases. Roth v. Black & Decker, U.S., Inc., 737 F.2d 779, 782
(8th Cir. 1984).
48. Rule 407 explicitly states that "[t]his rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." FED. R.
EVID. 407. In light of those specific exceptions, I find it difficult to conclude that Congress
did not intend the Rule to apply to strict liability cases; surely, such a significant exception,
if intended, would have been stated in the Rule.
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defendant's vulnerability to jurisdiction make it possible, to select
a federal district court whose interpretation of Rule 407 is the
more favorable.
A recent opinion of the Tenth Circuit leads to a possible second
level of forum selection in such cases. In Moe v. Avions Marcel
Dassault-BrequetAviation,49 the court concluded that "when state
courts have interpreted Rule 407 or its equivalent state counterpart, the question whether subsequent remedial measures are excluded from evidence is a matter of state policy." 50 Consequently,
the Moe court determined that a diversity court should apply the
state rule.
The Tenth Circuit articulated the rationale for its conclusion in
this manner: "The purpose of Rule 407 is not to seek the truth or
to expedite trial proceedings; rather, in our view, it is one designed
to promote state policy in a substantive law area. '51 Had the court
been writing tabula rasa, its rationale might be persuasive. However, in deciding if Congress intended state law to determine the
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures in diversity cases,
the Federal Rules of Evidence should be examined. It is apparent
from Rules 501 and 601, already discussed, that, when Congress
intended state law to apply in diversity cases, it knew the appropriate language to utilize.52 No such language appears in Rule 407.
Moreover, it seems apparent that in enacting Rule 407 Congress
intended one rule to be applicable in all of the circuits. Since the
other circuits have applied Rule 407 in diversity cases, irrespective
of state law, the idiosyncratic conclusion achieved by the Tenth
Circuit becomes suspect. Finally, the conclusion achieved by the
Tenth Circuit
overlooks the fact that the substantive judgment that underlies Rule 407 is
entwined with procedural considerations. It is only because juries are believed to overreact to evidence of subsequent remedial measures that the
admissibility of such evidence could deter defendants from taking such
measures ....
Congress's judgment that juries are apt to give too much
weight to such evidence is a procedural judgment ... that is, a judgment

concerning procedures to enhance accuracy or reduce expense in the adjudicative process. It is therefore well within the power of Congress to make for
49. 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 932.
51.

Id.

52. Both Rules 501 and 601 explicitly state that the issue involved "shall be determined in accordance with State law." FED. R. EVID. 501 and 601.

1985

Conflicts Law and Rules of Evidence

the federal courts
jurisdiction. s

with respect to any class of cases within their

For all of those reasons, I think the conclusion achieved by the
Tenth Circuit in Moe is not appropriate.
But, of course, what I think comes in a very poor second to the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Moe with regard to actions brought in
diversity courts within that circuit. Plaintiff's counsel, desirous of
having subsequent remedial measures received in evidence and
cognizant of Moe, will want to determine if the defendant is vulnerable to diversity jurisdiction in two or more district courts sitting in different states within the Tenth Circuit. If that is the case,
counsel will have to determine the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures in each of the states. Let's assume that such evidence would be admissible in State A and excluded in State B.
That, in turn, would raise the question of the applicability of
Klaxon. If Klaxon were not applicable, counsel's decision to sue in
a diversity court sitting in State A would automatically lead to the
application of that state's law and the evidence would be admissible. Were counsel to sue in State B, that state's law would apply
and the evidence would be excluded. On the other hand, if Klaxon
were applicable, suit in a diversity court in State A or State B
would require the diversity court to resolve any choice-of-law issue
precisely as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of
the forum state.
Should Klaxon be deemed applicable? I think the answer is yes,
given the Moe decision. The Tenth Circuit in Moe arrived at its
conclusion that state law was applicable to the admissibility of
subsequent remedial measures by determining that "[t]he decision
is necessarily a state policy matter." 4 In effect, the Tenth Circuit
arrived at a judicial determination with regard to Rule 407 analogous to the legislative determination achieved by Congress with regard to Rules 501 and 601: In diversity cases involving this issue,
there is no federal interest of sufficient significance to justify supplanting state law. 55 In those analogous situations under Rules 501
and 601, Klaxon is applicable for the same reason: there is no federal interest of sufficient significance to justify supplanting state
conflicts law with federally fashioned conflicts law. Consequently,
given the judicial conclusion achieved in Moe, I believe that a di53.
54.
55.

Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984).
727 F.2d at 932.
See supra text accompanying note 22; supra text accompanying notes 38, 39 & 40.
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versity court sitting in State A or State B and confronted with a
choice-of-law problem as to which state's local law should apply-State A's, which would admit the evidence, or State B's,
which would exclude the evidence-must resolve that problem just
as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of the forum
state.
To determine how each state court would resolve the problem
through interest analysis, we need to have more facts. Let's assume, that defendant manufacturer makes the product in State A
and that plaintiff was injured by the product in State B. Presumably, the reasons underlying State A's law, under which evidence of
subsequent remedial measures would be admissible, are (1) that
state's determination that such admissibility is not likely to deter
the manufacturer from effecting product improvements, and (2)
that state's belief that the admissibility of such evidence is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process in that state.
In reality, those two reasons can be refined to one. State A believes
that such evidence is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process in that state and receives such evidence to achieve
that goal, feeling that its receipt will have no adverse effect on the
manufacturer's conduct. In other words, preserving judicial integrity is the reason for the law; its lack of adverse effect on conduct
is a happy (and hopeful) concomitant. Presumably, the reason underlying State B's law, under which evidence of subsequent remedial measures would be excluded, is that state's belief that the admissibility of such evidence would deter the manufacturer from
effecting product improvements, and that state's willingness to
forego such evidence as a means of avoiding that undesired
deterrence.
If plaintiff's counsel brings the action in a diversity court sitting
in State A, the court would recognize that the reason for that
state's law converted into a significant interest on the part of that
state in having its law applied. Because State A was the forum
state, its concern with preserving the integrity of the judicial process within that state would convert. When the diversity court sitting in State A looked to the reason underlying State B's law, the
court would conclude that that reason too converted. Because
plaintiff was injured in State B, that state's interest in conduct
regulation, manifested by its belief that admissibility would deter
product improvement, would convert into a significant interest on
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the part of State B in having its law applied." Given those conclusions, the diversity court in State A would have to weigh the competing interests and make an educated judicial guess as to which
interest the highest appellate court in State A would find more significant. It is possible that the diversity court would conclude that
the State A court would be inclined to prefer its own interest in
preserving the integrity of the judicial process in that state and, for
that reason, apply State A's law and receive the evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
But suppose the action were initiated in a diversity court sitting
in State B. In those circumstances, since State A would no longer
be the forum state, its concern with preserving the integrity of the
judicial process in that state would not convert. State A would
have no significant interest in the application of its law. State B's
interest in conduct regulation, that is, in not dissuading the manufacturer from effecting product improvements, would subsist, since
the plaintiff was injured in State B. Obviously, it is in part to avoid
such injuries in State B that State B would exclude the evidence,
thus, hopefully, encouraging product improvements. That would
create a false conflict; only State B would have a significant interest in having its law applied. The diversity court sitting in State B
and emulating the highest appellate court of that state would apply State B's law and exclude the evidence of subsequent remedial
measures.
The basic division of the circuits over whether or not Rule 407
should apply to strict liability cases provides counsel with a rather
apparent forum selection decision. The Tenth Circuit's conclusion
in Moe that state law should determine the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures creates a somewhat more subtle, but
equally important, problem of forum selection. As noted above,
counsel's discriminating selection of forum, whether between a diversity court in the Eighth Circuit or in some other circuit, or, in
the Tenth Circuit, between a diversity court in State A or State B,
could prove to be determinative of the admissibility of subsequent
56. When a state's local law rests on a conduct-regulation reason, I believe that reason
converts to a significant interest on the part of that state in having its local law applied
when (1) the conduct intended to be regulated occurs in that state, or (2) the immediate
consequences of that conduct occur in that state, or (3) the on-going consequences of that
conduct will be felt in that state. A state's interest in regulating conduct generally rests on a
desire to avoid the immediate or on-going adverse consequences which such conduct is likely
to generate; therefore, the interest would apply to any of the three situations noted. See
Seidelson, supra note 18, at 239 (1981).
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remedial measures.
V.

RULE

804(b)(1)

AND FORMER TESTIMONY

Rule 804(b)(1) provides that, in a civil action, the former testimony of a now unavailable witness is admissible against a party if
that party, or "a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination '" 5 in the earlier proceeding. As submitted by the
Court, the proposed rule would have "allowed prior testimony of
an unavailable witness to be admissible if the party against whom
it is offered or a person 'with motive and interest similar' to his
had [had] an opportunity to examine the witness."5 8 That proposed rule was in keeping with the then generally accepted view. 59

The italicized language was added to the present Rule by the
House Judiciary Committee because of its belief "that it is generally unfair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being offered responsibility for the manner in which the
witness was previously handled by another party." 0 In the Committee's view, the only acceptable exception to that general unfairness arises "when [the present] party's predecessor in interest...
had an opportunity and similar motive to examine the [now unavailable] witness.""1 My own reaction is in accord with that of the
Committee. To impose on the present litigant the manner of examination conducted by some earlier litigant's counsel would be to
curtail unfairly the current litigant's right to counsel of his choice.
Where, however, the present litigant has assumed the role of a successor in interest to the earlier litigant, the imposition can be justified as a part of the package acquired by the present litigant. I
believe that the change effected by the Committee was an improvement over the pre-existing view.
The Third Circuit, however, in Lloyd v. American Export Lines,
Inc.,62 gave the phrase "predecessor in interest" an interpretation
so broad as to make it nearly synonymous with any prior party
having a similar motive and interest in examining the now unavailable witness.6 3 In doing so, the Third Circuit, in my opinion, ne804(b)(1).

57.
58.

FED. R. EVID.

59.

FED.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978).
Alvarez sought damages from American Export Lines for injuries Alvarez suffered

HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REP.

No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).

R.

EvID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee note.
HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
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gated the rather clear legislative intent manifested in the House
Judiciary Committee Report. That, I think, is an unfortunate example of a court's unwillingness to acquiesce in a congressionally
enacted change in evidence law. However, my feelings aside, the
Third Circuit's opinion in Lloyd creates another opportunity for
counsel to affect an evidentiary conclusion by a discriminating sein "a violent altercation between Alvarez and a fellow crewmember, . . Lloyd, that occurred on . . . the SS Export Commerce .... " 580 F.2d at 1181. "It was Alvarez' theory
that Export negligently failed to safeguard him from Lloyd after Export had knowledge of
Lloyd's dangerous propensities." Id. At trial, Alvarez testified as to his version of the fight
with Lloyd. Id. at 1182. Defendant offered in evidence the prior testimony of the unavailable Lloyd as it had been transcribed at an earlier proceeding conducted by the Coast Guard
for the purpose of determining "whether Lloyd's merchant mariner's document should have
been suspended or revoked on the basis of charges of misconduct brought against him for
the fight with Alvarez." Id. The trial court excluded the offered transcript, concluding that
it did not satisfy Rule 804(b)(1)'s requirements; the Third Circuit concluded that, in so
doing, the trial court had "misinterpreted" the Rule. Id. The Third Circuit determined that
the Coast Guard had been a "predecessor in interest" to Alvarez, within the meaning of
804(b)(1), because of the "community of interest shared by the Coast Guard in its hearing
and Alvarez in the subsequent civil trial." Id. at 1185-86. The Court stated: "The interest
implicated here was a claim or desire or demand which Alvarez as an individual, and the
Coast Guard as a representative of a larger group, sought to satisfy, and which has been
recognized as socially valid by authoritative decision-makers in our society." Id. at 1186.
The concurring opinion disagreed with the majority's construction of "the 'predecessor in
interest' language of Rule 804(b)(1)." Id. at 1190 (Stem, J., concurring): "The majority here
holds that because the Coast Guard investigating officer shared a community of interest
with Alvarez he was Alvarez' predecessor in interest. I believe that this analysis is contrary
to the Rule's clear language and is foreclosed by its legislative history." Id.
The concurring opinion concluded that the transcript of Lloyd's testimony was admissible
"under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule, 804(b)(5)." Id. As to whether the residual
exception to 804 should be used to admit evidence that fails to satisfy a particular requirement of 804(b)(1), see In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 444 F. Supp.
110, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1978), where the court, finding that 804(b)(1)'s requirement of "predecessor in interest" had not been satisfied, declined to admit under 804(b)(5) because "it is
unlikely that Congress meant this exception to be used to circumvent its own restriction of
another exception."
In Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1983), appeal filed, the
Sixth Circuit stated: "We join the Third Circuit in agreeing with the Senate Committee that
the difference between the ultimate revision and the Rule, as originally proposed, is 'not
great.'... Accordingly, we adopt the position taken by the Lloyd court.
... Id. at 129495.
Consequently, the forum selection possibilities generated by Lloyd for the Third Circuit
would seem to be available in the Sixth Circuit as well.
See also E. EPSTEIN, G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OP EVIDENCE 301-02 (1983):
The problems that the courts face in defining the term "predecessor in interest" is
[sic] attributable in no small part to the absence of a clear definition in the legislative
history. Thus far, most courts-the Lloyd majority being the exception-have attempted to make the term mean something more than the similar motive approach
rejected by the Congress.
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lection of forum.
If plaintiff's counsel recognizes that his client's cause will be
served by the receipt in evidence of the former testimony of a now
unavailable witness, obviously counsel will seek that forum where
the former testimony is most likely to be held admissible. If, in the
former proceeding, the now unavailable witness was cross-examined on behalf of a party having a similar motive and interest as
the present defendant, but that prior party was not a "predecessor
in interest" to the present defendant, plaintiff's counsel will recognize that the apparent requirement of Rule 804(b)(1) is not satisfied. Nevertheless, given the Third Circuit's conclusion in Lloyd,
substantially negating any independent significance to the phrase
"predecessor in interest," plaintiff's counsel is likely to recognize
that there is an excellent chance that the former testimony will be
held admissible in any federal district court within the Third Circuit. Consequently, assuming that defendant is vulnerable to jurisdiction in any such district court, whether the action be a diversity
case or a federal cause of action, plaintiff's counsel may well opt
for such a forum, thus enhancing the likelihood of the admissibility
of the favorable former testimony.
Because I believe that Lloyd frustrated the legislative intent underlying 804(b)(1)'s requirement of "predecessor in interest," I
think that the forum selection opportunity afforded by the Third
Circuit in Lloyd is inappropriate. However, unless and until the
court en banc or the Supreme Court demonstrates by decision that
Lloyd was incorrect, the opportunity for forum selection will subsist and counsel should avail his client of its benefit.
VI.

RULE

803(3)

AND STATE OF MIND DECLARATIONS

Rule 803(3) treats as an exception to the hearsay rule "[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind . . . but not
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed . .. ,". Further insight into the significance of that limiting italicized language may be found in the
House Judiciary Committee Report. The Committee stated its intent "that the Rule be construed to limit the doctrine of Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon . . . so as to render statements of
intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct,
not the future conduct of another person. 6 5 With regard to the
64.

65.

FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (emphasis added).
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REP. No.

93-650, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 13-14 (1974)
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conduct of another, declarant's declaration necessarily
be based on his memdry or belief as to that other's contemconduct. There may be at least a facial inconsistency bethat language and the Advisory Committee's Note that

"[t]he rule of Mutual Life Ins. Co., v. Hillmon . . . allowing evi-

dence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is, of course, left undisturbed.""6 To determine the extent
of that inconsistency, a review of Hillmon6 7 becomes essential.
In Hillmon, plaintiff sued insurance companies to recover the
benefits of life insurance policies issued to her husband. The defendants asserted that the body found at Crooked Creek was not
that of Hillmon, the insured, but rather that of Walters. To
demonstrate that Walters and Hillmon had traveled together to
Crooked Creek, defendants offered two letters written by Walters,
one to his fiancee" and one to his sister,"9 indicating such joint
travel plans. The Supreme Court concluded that the letters should
have been received in evidence as state of mind exceptions to the
hearsay rule. More specifically, the Court found that "[t]he letters
(emphasis added).
66. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee note.
67. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
68. The letter read as follows:
Wichita, March 1, 1879
Dearest Alvina: Your kind and ever welcome letter was received yesterday afternoon about an hour before I left Emporia. I will stay here until the fore part of next
week, and then will leave here to see a part of the country that I never expected to
see when I left home, as I am going with a man by the name of Hillmon, who intends
to start a sheep ranch, and as he promised me more wages than I could make at
anything else I concluded to take it, for a while at least, until I strike something
better. There is so many folks in this country that have got the Leadville fever, and if
I could not of got the situation that I have now I would have went there myself; but
as it is at present I get to see the best portion of Kansas, Indian Territory, Colorado,
and Mexico. The route that we intend to take would cost a man to travel from $150
to $200, but it will not cost me a cent; besides, I get good wages. I will drop you a
letter occasionally until I get settled down; then I want you to answer it.
Id. at 288-89.
69. The second letter read as follows:
Wichita, Kansas-March 4th or 5th or 3d or 4th-I don't know-1879
Dear Sister and all: I now in my usual style drop you a few lines to let you know
that I expect to leave Wichita on or about March the 5th, with a certain Mr. Hillmon,
a sheep-trader, for Colorado or parts unknown to me. I expect to see the country now.
News are of no interest to you, as you are not acquainted here. I will close with compliments to all inquiring friends.
Love to all.
I am truly your brother
FRED. ADOLPH WALTERS.
Id. at 288.
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in question were competent . . . as evidence that . . . [Walters]
had the intention of going, and of going with HiUmon, which made
it more probable both that he did go and that he went with
Hillmon . . 70
Rather clearly, the Court determined that the state of mind declarations of Walters were admissible to evidence his future conduct
and the future conduct of Hillmon.
Does the language of the Advisory Committee's Note to the effect that Hilimon is "left undisturbed" by Rule 803(3) encompass
the totality of the Hilimon holding? Maybe yes, maybe no. The
Note's description of "[tihe rule of. . .Hillmon" is limited to "allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the
act intended ....,,7"
That language could be read as saying no
more than Walters' declarations of his travel plans may evidence
his actual travel. In that case, there would be no inconsistency between the Advisory Committee's Note and the House Judiciary
Committee Report: under both, Walters' declarations of intent
would be admissible to prove only Walters' future conduct; they
would not be admissible to prove the future conduct of Hillmon.
Still, it is clear that in Hilimon the Court approved the use of Walters' declarations to evidence the future conduct of both Walters
and Hillmon, and the Advisory Committee's Note does say that
Hilimon is "left undisturbed." Consequently, it could well be concluded that there is an inconsistency between the Note and the
House Judiciary Committee Report.
Assuming such an inconsistency, which source should prevail?
For me, the question is an easy one. The precise limiting language
of the House Judiciary Committee Report should serve as the
manifestation of congressional intent. Therefore, I believe that all
of the circuits should impose the limiting language of that Committee Report. Were that done, there would be no opportunity for
forum selection among the various circuits. That result seems to
me exactly what Congress intended. For the various courts of appeals, however, the question seems to be less easy. The Second Circuit, in one case, apparently concluded (by way of dictum) that the
Advisory Committee's Note should prevail, 72 and, in another case,
apparently viewed the matter as an open question. 73 Both the
70.
71.
72.
73.
(1978).

145 U.S. at 295-96 (emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee note.
United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 1978).
United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 43 n.12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931

Conflicts Law and Rules of Evidence

1985

First74 and the Fourth Circuits7" have concluded that the House
Judiciary Committee Report governs. The Ninth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Pheaster76 may be particularly illuminating.
Hugh Pheaster and Angelo Inciso were convicted of conspiring
to kidnap 16-year-old Larry Adell. On appeal, Inciso asserted that
the trial court had erred in permitting government witnesses to
testify that, shortly before his disappearance, Adell had told the
witnesses "that he was going to meet Angelo at Sambo's North at
9:30 p.m. to 'pick up a pound of marijuana which Angelo had
promised him for free.' ",77
Inciso's contention that the district court erred in admitting the hearsay
testimony of Larry's friends [was] premised on the view that the statements
could not properly be used by the jury to conclude that Larry did in fact
meet Inciso in the parking lot of Sambo's North at approximately 9:30 p.m.
78

Under Hillmon, Adell's declarations might very well have been admissible to evidence the future conduct of Adell and Inciso. Consequently, the jury properly could have considered Adell's declarations as evidence that the two actually met. Under Rule 803(3),
however, to the extent that Adell's declarations were offered to
prove the future conduct of Inciso, those declarations would have
been offered to prove the existence of "the fact remembered or believed" by Adell with regard to Inciso's plans. Such use of a state
of mind declaration is expressly precluded by the language of Rule
803(3). Moreover, the House Judiciary Committee Report explicitly limits Hilimon "so as to render statements of intent by a declarant [Adell] admissible only to prove his future conduct, not the
future conduct of another person [Inciso]." Therefore, under Rule
803(3) and the Judiciary Committee Report thereto, Adell's declarations would not be admissible to prove Inciso's conduct.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Inciso's conviction. It did so after
noting that the trial had occurred prior to the effective date of the
Federal Rules of Evidence; therefore the issue was to be resolved
pursuant to "the prevailing common law view, namely, that the
Hillmon doctrine could be applied to facts such as those now
74. Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 579 F.2d 677, 680 n.2 (1st Cir. 1978).
75. United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 843, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
967 (1978).
76. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
77. Id. at 375.

78. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit noted that the result might have

been different had Rule 803(3) and the "legislative intention to cut
back on what [the House Judiciary Committee] also perceived to
be the .

.

. common law view""' been applicable.

So there we are. Some of the circuits appear willing to give effect
to the express limiting language in Rule 803(3) and the explicit
limitation appearing in the House Judiciary Committee Report;
others appear unwilling to accept a congressional intention to limit
Hillmon. For counsel, the moral is apparent. If plaintiff's counsel
recognizes that a declarant's state of mind declaration encompassing the future conduct of declarant and some third person will
favor plaintiff's cause, counsel, by a discriminating selection of forum, may be able to initiate the case, whether diversity action or
federal cause of action, in a federal district court sitting within a
circuit that has manifested an unwillingness to read Rule 803(3) as
imposing a limitation on Hilimon. By that careful selection of forum, counsel may make it significantly more likely that the offered
state of mind declaration will be admissible to evidence the future
conduct of both declarant and third person.
The limitation on Hillmon apparently intended by Congress in
enacting 803(3) (and recognized by at least some of the circuits)
generates a second level of forum selection. It may well be that the
highest appellate court of State A, in applying state evidentiary
rules, continues to follow the Hilimon decision.81 Let's assume that
79. Id. at 380. In fact, the Federal Rules of Evidence may have applied to the case on
appeal:
These rules apply to actions, cases, and proceedings brought after the rules take effect. These rules also apply to further procedure in actions, cases, and proceedings
then pending, except to the extent that application of the rules would not be feasible, or would work injustice, in which event former evidentiary principles apply.
Act of Jan. 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (emphasis added).
80. 544 F.2d at 380.
81. This proposition is borne out in several authorities. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, EvIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 179 (1983):
If the choice . . . is between admission for an inference of future conduct as to both
the declarant and another or exclusion. . . it is easy to see why trustworthy evidence
necessary to the litigation has been admitted at common law despite its awkward
relationship to the rule against hearsay and its exceptions.
Id. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 14:
If completion of a plan or design requires not only the continued inclination and
ability of the declarant to complete it but also the inclination and ability of someone
else, arguably the likelihood that the design or plan was completed is substantially
less. Despite some objection, however, courts have not imposed the limitation.
Id. at 848 (footnote omitted). See also LILLY, supra note 26:
[Miost courts have followed the apparent lead of the Supreme Court [in Hillmon] on
this question of how much of a declaration is admissible and have permitted a declar-
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the federal court of appeals encompassing State A is one that recognizes and applies Rule 803(3)'s limitation of Hillmon. Let's assume, too, that plaintiff's counsel contemplates initiating an action
in which diversity jurisdiction would be available. If plaintiff's
cause would be favored by the broader admissibility of state of
mind declarations under Hilimon, plaintiff's counsel may be influenced toward forsaking diversity jurisdiction and initiating the action in state court. In those circumstances, defendant's counsel,
cognizant of the evidentiary effect of forum selection, may be impelled toward removing the case to federal court on diversity
grounds, thus acquiring for his client the benefit of the narrower
admissibility contemplated by Rule 803(3) and accepted by the appropriate circuit court. That mutual opportunity for a discriminating selection of forum in a potential diversity case would seem to
be entirely appropriate, even though the forum selection possibility
was between a state and federal court sitting in the same state. It
would be the necessary consequence of different conclusions
achieved by Congress on the one hand and the highest appellate
court of State A (or the legislature of that state) on the other hand,
with regard to a purely evidentiary matter in which the forum, federal or state court, had the exclusive interest. Each forum's determination of the rule which would better preserve the integrity of
the judicial process would do little or nothing to frustrate any substantive interest of the other sovereign.
VII.

RULE

610 AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

Rule 610 provides that "[e]vidence of the beliefs or opinions of a
witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of
showing that by reason of their nature his credibility is impaired or
enhanced." 2 On its face, the Rule would seem to be consistent
with constitutional provisions or statutes common in the states
ant's statement of his present intention to undertake a course of action requiring the
cooperation of another to serve as evidence that the contemplated act was
accomplished.
Id. at 223 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). See also R. LAMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 429 (2d ed. 1981):
Most courts follow the Supreme Court [in Hillmon] . . .and allow a statement of an
intention to engage in some action with another to support the inference that this
action was done with the other and, since the two are not separable, to support the
inference that the other did the action with the declarant.

82.

FED.

R.

EVID. 610.
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precluding inquiry into the religious belief of a witness.83 The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 610, however, reads as follows:
While the rule forecloses inquiry into the religious beliefs or opinions of a
witness for the purpose of showing that his character for truthfulness is affected by their nature, an inquiry for the purpose of showing interest or bias
because of them is not within the prohibition. Thus disclosure of affiliation
with a church which is a party to the litigation would be allowable under
the rule. Cf. Tucker v. Reil ..

In Tucker,5 plaintiff sued decedent's estate on an alleged claim
which arose during decedent's lifetime. Decedent's will left the
bulk of his estate to the Seventh Day Adventist Church. In crossexamining defense witnesses, plaintiff's counsel elicited the fact
that they were members of the beneficiary church. The Supreme
Court of Arizona found that such cross-examination was precluded
by a provision of the state constitution. 6 Under the Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 610, such examination conducted "for
the purpose of showing interest or bias" might be permissible.
Given a case in which diversity jurisdiction is available, and hostile witnesses whose religious beliefs might evidence "interest or
bias," counsel for the plaintiff might well be inclined toward utilizing the diversity court, thus enhancing the likelihood that such impeaching cross-examination would be permitted. Conversely, if it is
plaintiff's witnesses who might be vulnerable to such cross-examination in federal court, plaintiff's counsel might forsake diversity
jurisdiction in the hope of precluding such cross-examination pur83. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12 ("[N]or [shall any person] be questioned touching his religious belief in any court of justice to affect the weight of his testimony."); CAL.
EvID. CODE § 789 (Deering 1966) ("Evidence of his religious belief ...
is inadmissible to
attack or support the credibility of a witness."); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-110 (1973) ("[N]or
shall any witness be questioned in regard to his religious opinions."); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27
A-1436 (Callaghan 1976) ("No witness may be questioned in relation to his opinions on
religion, either before or after he is sworn."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-84A-24 (West 1976)
("Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose his ... religious belief unless his adherence .

.

. to such [a] .

.

. belief is material to an issue in the action other than that of his

credibility as a witness."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902(b) (Purdon 1978) ("No witness shall be
questioned, in any judicial proceeding, concerning his religious belief; nor shall any evidence
be heard upon the subject, for the purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("[N]or [shall any person] be questioned in any court of
justice touching his religious belief to affect the weight of his testimony."). Contra: IND.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1-14-13 (1983) ("No want of a belief in a Supreme Being, or in the Christian
religion shall render a witness incompetent. But the want of such religious belief may be
shown upon the trial.").
84. FED. R. EvID. 610 advisory committee note.
85. Tucker v. Reil, 51 Ariz. 357, 77 P.2d 203 (1938).
86. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12 (for text, see supra note 83).
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suant to a prohibitory state statute or constitutional provision. Of
course, in those circumstances, defendant's counsel might be motivated to remove the case to federal court, thus invoking Rule 610.
Is there any potential impropriety in that mutual opportunity
for forum selection? As with Rule 803(3), discussed above, the forum shopping opportunity is between state and federal courts sitting in the same state. Unlike the situation with 803(3), this instance of forum selection would seem to implicate a rather
significant state interest. A state statute or constitutional provision
precluding inquiry into the religious beliefs of a witness presumably exists for the primary purpose of protecting the privacy of an
individual's religious convictions. Such a statute or constitutional
provision manifests a state determination that protecting that privacy interest is of greater importance than having revealed a particular source of witness bias or interest.
In addition, a state statute or constitutional provision excluding
evidence of the religious affiliation of a witness could have a secondary purpose. Such a prohibition could reflect a desire to avoid
prejudicing a witness or the party calling the witness should the
particular religious affiliation prove to be "unpopular" with the
fact finder. That concern would go to the state's interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial process within that state.
Clearly, counsel's decision to utilize diversity jurisdiction,
thereby invoking Rule 610, would frustrate the state's concern with
protecting the privacy interest of the witness and its concern with
preserving the integrity of the judicial process. Is there any countervailing federal interest that justifies such a frustration of the
state's concerns? Well, the obvious impact of the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 610 is that revelation of witness bias or interest is so critical to assuring the integrity of the (federal) judicial
process that even religious belief may be inquired into for that
purpose. Frankly, I think the congressional decision was an unfortunate one. I am inclined to feel rather strongly that preserving the
individual's privacy with regard to his religious convictions is of
greater moment than revealing possible bias or interest through a
violation of such privacy. Yet, by definition, in a diversity case, the
primary concern with preserving the integrity of the judicial process is a federal one. If Congress has concluded, as the Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 610 indicates, that the integrity of the
judicial process requires the revelation of the religious affiliation of
a witness, when such revelation would demonstrate bias or interest,
that congressional conclusion rests on a legitimate federal interest.
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Moreover, in enacting Rule 610, Congress did not subjugate that
federal interest to any contrary state interest, as it did in the second sentences of Rule 501 (privilege) and Rule 601 (competency).
Apparently, Congress intended that the federal interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process was to be given effect over
any contrary state concern.
But what of the secondary reason for the state's precluding inquiry into religious affiliation: to preserve the integrity of the state
judicial process by preventing potential prejudice generated by an
"unpopular" religious affiliation? Earlier, and on several occasions,
we have suggested that a state concern with preserving the integrity of the judicial process should be considered by a diversity
court sitting in that state, as a means of being true to the spirit of
Klaxon.8 7 Should that consideration apply here? I think not. Here,
unlike those earlier instances, Congress has made an explicit determination as to what approach best serves the integrity of the federal judicial process: revelation of religious affiliation for the purpose of exposing bias or interest. Given that clear Congressional
determination, I believe that the state's contrary decision as to
what better serves the integrity of the judicial process must yield
to the will of Congress.
Consequently, and notwithstanding my own personal view, I
think it must be concluded that the forum selection opportunity in
a diversity case between state and federal courts sitting in the
same state, and the evidentiary impact of that choice with regard
to the religious affiliation of a witness, are consequences which
Congress contemplated and approved and which rest on a legitimate federal interest. Therefore, I believe it would be appropriate
for counsel seeking the opportunity to cross-examine hostile witnesses as to religious affiliation for the purpose of demonstrating
bias or interest to opt for the diversity court.
VIII.

RULE

613

AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS

Rule 613(a) provides that: "In examining a witness concerning a
prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that
time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to op87. See text under headings Rule 501: Privileges in Diversity Actions; Rule 601: Competency of Witnesses in Diversity Actions; Rule 407 and Subsequent Remedial Measures;
Rule 302 and Presumptions in Diversity Cases.
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posing counsel.""s Apparent from the Advisory Committee's Note 9
is that 613(a) was intended to effect a basic change: counsel may
cross-examine a hostile witness with regard to a prior inconsistent
statement without first disclosing the statement to the witness.
Rule 613(b), too, was intended to make a basic change in traditional law. It provides:
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the
same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require."

The change effected by 613(b) is one of chronology. As the Advisory Committee's Note explains:
The traditional insistence that the attention of the witness be directed to
the statement on cross-examination is relaxed in favor of simply providing
the witness an opportunity to explain and the opposite party an opportunity to examine on the statement, with no specification of any particular
time or sequence."

Taken together, 613(a) and (b) may make for a more effective
cross-examination of a witness who has made a prior inconsistent
statement. But that means of achieving a more efficient impeachment of a hostile witness is hardly likely to persuade counsel to opt
for federal, rather than state, court. What may be more significant
about Rule 613 is what it does not say. Nowhere in the Rule is
there any prohibition of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence on
a collateral matter for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of
a witness. The absence of such a prohibition is particularly striking
in 613(b), which deals specifically with extrinsic evidence of prior
inconsistent statements.
Let's examine a state case in which the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement on the ground that it
dealt with collateral matter was at the nub of the court's decision.
Although the case is a criminal one, the same problem could have
arisen in a wrongful death action. In Smith v. State,92 defendant
appealed her conviction of the second-degree murder of her husband. The prosecution's theory of the case was that defendant had
intentionally shot her husband with a sawed-off shotgun. Defen88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

R. EvID. 613(a).
R. EVID. 613(a) advisory committee note.
R. EvID. 613(b).
R. EvID 613(b) advisory committee note.
273 Md. 152, 328 A.2d 274 (1974).
FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.
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dant asserted that the shooting had been an accident. In the prosecution's case-in-chief, a police officer who had arrived at the scene
shortly after the shooting testified that the husband had said that
defendant shot him and that defendant had responded, "Yes, I
shot the son of a bitch."93 In cross-examination, the officer denied
having told a defense investigator, after the officer had visited the
husband in the hospital, that the husband had said the shooting
was an accident. In the defense case, the investigator offered to
testify that the police officer had made the exculpating statement
to him. That testimony was offered to impeach the credibility of
the police officer. The prosecution's objection that the offered testimony constituted extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter was
sustained. The Maryland Court of Appeals, dividing 4-2, reversed,
concluding that the extrinsic evidence had not been on a collateral
matter. The majority offered an insightful analysis for determining
when extrinsic evidence offered for impeachment purposes was or
was not collateral. Under that analysis, if the extrinsic evidence
would be substantively material (though not substantively admissible), it is not collateral. Since the victim's alleged declaration that
the shooting had been accidental would have been material (although not substantively admissible because of the hearsay within
hearsay), it was not collateral; therefore it was properly admissible
to impeach the credibility of the police officer.
The core of the problem in Smith, the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter for the purpose of impeachment,
constitutes a traditional judicial conclusion. 4 Yet, nothing in Rule
613 mandates the application of that traditional view. Moreover,
613(a) and (b) change two other traditional conclusions: (1) that a
prior inconsistent statement must be disclosed to the witness
before he may be examined on it, and (2) that extrinsic evidence of
a prior inconsistent statement may not be received before the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the same. Is it possible that Rule 613 tacitly effects a third change in tradition: the
elimination of the bar to admissibility of a prior inconsistent state93. 273 Md. at 154, 328 A.2d at 276.
94. See MCCORMICK, supra note 14:
[Miany courts maintain the safeguarding rule that a witness may not be impeached
by producing extrinsic evidence of "collateral" facts to "contradict" the first witness'
assertions about those facts. If the collateral fact sought to be contradicted is elicited
on cross-examination, this safeguarding rule is often expressed by saying that the
answer is conclusive or that the cross-examiner must "take the answer."
Id. at 110 (footnotes omitted).
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ment offered to impeach but on a collateral matter?
If the answer to that question is yes, then Rule 613 may indeed
generate another instance of discriminating forum selection. If
plaintiff's counsel contemplates that the credibility of a key defense witness may be seriously impeached by a prior inconsistent
statement, but that statement goes to collateral matter, counsel
will recognize that traditional state evidentiary rulings are likely to
exclude extrinsic evidence of the prior statement. Counsel is likely
to recognize, too, that the hostile witness may on cross-examination deny having made the prior statement. Under the traditional
view, counsel would have to "take" the witness' answer; extrinsic
evidence from the auditor of the alleged prior statement would be
excluded.9 5 But suppose that diversity jurisdiction is available.
Then, assuming that Rule 613 tacitly eliminates the bar to admissibility of such extrinsic evidence, plaintiff's counsel, by electing to
utilize diversity jurisdiction, could assure the admissibility of the
extrinsic evidence. Conversely, if defendant's counsel contemplates
a similar opportunity to impeach the credibility of a key witness
for the plaintiff, and plaintiff's counsel, motivated in part by his
realization of the problem, foresakes diversity jurisdiction and sues
in state court, defendant's counsel could remove the case to federal
court and assure the admissibility of the extrinsic evidence.
Assuming their existence, would such mutual opportunities for
forum selection be inappropriate? I think not. Presumably, the
reason for the traditional rule excluding extrinsic evidence on a
collateral matter goes to a desire to protect the integrity of the
judicial process. The fear is that such extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter may confuse the fact finder and generate "a trial
within a trial" as to the collateral matter introduced, thus wasting
valuable court time and conceivably disconcerting the attention of
the fact finder from the basic issues presented.9 6 Clearly, a state
court retaining the traditional view would have a legitimate interest in excluding such extrinsic evidence for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the judicial process in that court. Still assuming
that Rule 613 tacitly eliminates the bar in federal court, a diversity
court would have a legitimate interest in receiving the extrinsic evidence. If 613 does eliminate the bar, it is presumably because of
95. See supra note 94.
96. See MCCORMICK, supra note 14: "To permit a dispute ... about such extraneous
or 'collateral' facts ...
by allowing the attacker to call other witnesses to disprove them, is
not practical. Dangers of surprise, of confusion of the jury's attention, and of time-wasting
are apparent." Id. at 110 (footnotes omitted).
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congressional determinations that (1) hearing such extrinsic evidence will not adversely affect the integrity of the federal judicial
process, and (2) hearing such extrinsic evidence to impeach credibility will, in fact, enhance the integrity of the judicial process by
providing the fact finder with an additional basis for determining
credibility. Exclusion or admission of extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter for impeachment purposes would seem to go exclusively toward preserving judicial integrity. Therefore, the forum,
whether state or federal, would have a legitimate interest in applying its own rule.
Now, the ultimate question. Should Rule 613 be read as tacitly
eliminating the traditional bar? I think the answer should be no.
Analysis of the reasons underlying the traditional view, fear of confusing the fact finder and waste of time, which, itself, may disconcert the fact finder, suggests the applicability of Rule 403.17 That
Rule provides that: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."9' 8 I am inclined to think that federal district court judges are likely to, and should, construe Rule
403 as continuing the traditional judicial conclusion that extrinsic
evidence on a collateral matter offered to impeach credibility is not
admissible."9 Consequently, I think it is unlikely that Rule 613 will
97.

FED.

R.

EVID.

403.

98. Id.
99. Cf. United States v. Bodden, 736 F.2d 142, 145 (4th Cir. 1984) ("the right [of
cross-examination] is not so broad 'as to deprive the district court of all discretion in limiting needless or confusing inquiry into collateral matters.' United States v. Cole, 622 F.2d 98
(4th Cir. 1980)."); Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1984) (dissenting opinion)
(Rule 403 should be used to exclude impeachment by prior felony conviction in civil action;
with citations to other cases so "modif[ying] Rule 609 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence].").
Rule 608(b) precludes the use of extrinsic evidence to prove "specific instances of the
conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility ....
" "[In
the discretion of the court, [however]," such conduct may "be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness. . . concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ....
"
FED. R. EvID. 608(b). The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 608(b) indicates that the scope
of such cross-examination would be subject to "the overriding protection of Rule 403
[which] requires that probative value not be outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confession of issues, or misleading the jury ....
" FED. R. EVID. 608(b) Advisory Committee
Note. Although Rule 608(b) deals with "conduct" rather than prior statements, and although the Advisory Committee's Note implicating Rule 403 deals with the scope of crossexamination rather than extrinsic evidence, I believe that there is a sufficient analogy to
confirm the propriety of using Rule 403 to exclude extrinsic evidence of prior statements on
collateral matters, as suggested in the text.
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generate any significant opportunity for forum selection between
state and federal courts sitting in the same state.

IX.

RULE

801(d)(1)(A)

AND

(B)

AND PRIOR STATEMENTS BY A

WITNESS

Under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), a prior inconsistent statement of a witness is admissible substantively if the statement "was given under
oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition." 10 0 Under 801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement of a witness is admissible substantively if the
statement "rebut[s] an express or implied charge against [the witness] of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive."' 0 1
Traditionally, of course, such prior statements were treated as
hearsay and admissible only to impeach credibility, if inconsistent
with the witness' testimony, or to rehabilitate, if consistent with
1 02
the witness' testimony.
With regard to receiving prior inconsistent statements substantively, there was a difference of opinion between the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees. The House Committee would have
imposed as conditions precedent to such admissibility that the
statement had been made (1) under oath, (2) subject to the penalty
of perjury, (3) at a trial, hearing, or deposition, and (4) subject to
cross-examination.1 0 3 The Senate Committee would have accepted
the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court which imposed none
of those conditions. 104 The Conference Report adopted the view
now reflected in the Rule: the first three of the House-proposed
conditions must be met; the prior inconsistent statement need not
have been made at a time when the declarant was subject to crossexamination.10 5 With regard to prior consistent statements, Congress enacted the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court.106
100. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
101. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
102. "Prior inconsistent statements traditionally have been admissible to impeach but
not as substantive evidence." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee note. "Prior
consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence." FED. R. EVD.
801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee note.
103. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, 7104.

104. Id.
105.

Id.

106.

See PRELIMINARY

DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES,

Rule 801(c)(2)(ii) (1969).
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In a civil action, counsel for the plaintiff may find that a legally
sufficient case can be made only if a prior (potentially) inconsistent
statement made by an unfriendly witness is admissible substantively. Assuming (1) the availability of diversity jurisdiction, and
(2) a state court which retains the traditional view that such statements are admissible only for impeachment purposes,' counsel's
utilization of diversity jurisdiction could make the difference between the court's granting or denying defendant's motion for directed verdict. Clearly, plaintiff's counsel will opt for diversity jurisdiction and a legally sufficient case.
Is that dramatic difference in result stemming from counsel's
utilization of diversity jurisdiction legally appropriate? I think the
answer is yes. Congress' decision to receive such prior inconsistent
statements substantively would appear to be clearly within the domain of regulating trials in federal courts. The congressional determination that such prior inconsistent statements are sufficiently
trustworthy to be received substantively improperly infringes no
significant state interest.
As to prior consistent statements, plaintiff's counsel will not be
able to achieve a similar dramatic effect by utilizing diversity jurisdiction. Here, by definition, the prior statement must be consistent
with the witness' in-court testimony in order to be admissible substantively. Consequently, bringing the action in federal court on
diversity grounds would not convert a legally insufficient case into
one legally sufficient; rather, it would make it possible for counsel
to strengthen a legally sufficient case by having two favorable
statements from the same witness received substantively. Of
course, that's not bad. Probably every lawyer recognizes the value
of corroborating evidence, even when the corroboration comes from
the same witness. That consideration, in turn, suggests another
problem.
Let's assume-that plaintiff's witness W is prepared to testify in a
manner favorable to plaintiff's case. Let's assume, too, that W
made a prior statement entirely consistent with his favorable incourt testimony. Presumably, plaintiff's counsel would like to have
the prior statement received substantively. If defendant's counsel
were to impeach W's credibility in a manner implying that his incourt testimony was the product of "recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive,"'0° and, if W's prior consistent statement re107.
108.

See supra note 102.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
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butted such an implication, the prior statement would be admissible substantively under 801(d)(1)(B). But suppose defense counsel
does not so impeach W's credibility. May plaintiff's counsel still
achieve the substantive admissibility of W's prior consistent
statement?
Under Rule 607, "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked
by any party, including the party calling him."' 0 9 Suppose that
plaintiff's counsel believes that he can impeach W's credibility in a
manner implying "recent fabrication" but then significantly rebut
the implication by offering the prior consistent statement, both to
rehabilitate and as substantive evidence. Plaintiff's counsel believes that that technique will have a desirable "halo effect" with
the jury, suggesting plaintiff's total dedication to the truth, and,
not incidentally, have W's prior consistent statement received as
an additional piece of substantive evidence. Should the ploy be
permitted? I think the answer is no. The Advisory Committee's
Note to 801(d)(1)(B) states that:
Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut
charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as
substantive evidence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence. The
prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand, and, if
the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence,
no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.'"

That italicized language indicates that the substantive admissibility of prior consistent statements was intended to be triggered
only by adversarial impeachment. Consequently, while plaintiff's
counsel may be free to impeach W's credibility (if counsel chooses)
and then rehabilitate that credibility by eliciting the prior consistent statement (in the interest of demonstrating total ingenuousness to the jury, and, perhaps, as a means of anticipating opposing
counsel's cross-examination), the prior consistent statement should
be received only for its rehabilitating effect and not as substantive
evidence.
We have already noted that, if defendant's counsel "opens the
door" on cross-examination by impeaching W's credibility, plaintiff's counsel may on redirect elicit the prior consistent statement
and have it received substantively, as well as for its rehabilitating
effect, provided that the prior consistent statement rebuts an implication of "recent fabrication or improper influence or motive."
109.
110.

FED.
FED.

R. EVID. 607.
R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee note (emphasis added).
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And we have noted, too, that plaintiff's counsel is likely to be delighted with that opportunity of achieving two pieces of favorable.
substantive evidence for the price of just one witness, made possible by plaintiff's counsel's election to bring the action in federal
court on diversity grounds. Is that benefit arising from counsel's
selection of a federal court inappropriate? I think not. Rather, it
seems to be an a fortiori instance of our earlier conclusion that
converting a legally insufficient case into a legally sufficient one
under 801(d)(1)(A) is entirely within the appropriate aegis of Congress. Clearly, Congress has the authority to determine that sufficient trustworthiness exists with regard to a prior consistent statement to receive it substantively, when triggered by opposing
counsel, in a diversity case. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) represents a Congressional conclusion that, in such circumstances, substantive admissibility creates no threat to the integrity of the federal judicial
process.
X.

RULE

801(d)(2)(D) AND VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS

Under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), a vicarious admission is described as
"a statement by [a party's] agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship."1 1 ' Under the Rule, such a vicarious
admission is not hearsay. Traditionally, an employee declaration
was treated as a vicarious admission only if the employee had been
authorized by the employer to make the statement, or the employee occupied a managerial position in the employer's business.1 2 Given the realities of the employer-employee relationship
R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D).
This traditional doctrine may be found stated in several authorities. See, e.g.,
MCCORMICK, supra note 14:
In the absence of express authority how far will the statements of an agent be received as the principal's admission by virtue of the employment relationship? The
early tests and cases used as analogies the doctrine of the master's substantive responsibility for the acts of the agent and the notion then prevalent in evidence law
that words accompanying a relevant act are admissible as part of the res gestae. Thus
they formulated the inadequate theory that the agent's statements could be received
against the principal only when made at the time of, and in relation to, some act then
being performed in the scope of the agent's duty. A later theory that gained currency
in the writings and opinions, is that the admissibility of the agent's statements into
evidence as admissions of the principal is measured by precisely the same tests as the
principal's substantive responsibility for the conduct of the agent, that is, the words
of the agent will be received in evidence as the admissions of the principal if they
were spoken within the scope of authority of the agent to speak for the employer.
This formula makes it plain that the statements of an agent employed to give infor111.
112.

FED.
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and the employer's instinctive or advised sense of self-interest, few
mation (a so-called "speaking agent") may be received as the employer's admissions
. . . and conversely that authority to act, e.g., the authority of a chauffeur to drive a
car, would not carry with it automatically the authority to make statements to others
describing what he was doing or had done ....
Probably the most frequent employment of this test is in the exclusion of statements
made by employees after an accident, to the injured party, to a police officer, or to
some bystander, about the accident not made in furtherance of the employer's interest, but as a "mere narrative."
Id. at 787-88 (footnotes omitted). See also LILLY, supra note 26:
In these cases, many courts, especially in their early decisions, take the narrow view
that the authority to speak either is non-existent or does not extend to statements of
fault or misdeeds that could result in the principal's liability. A truck driver, the
reasoning goes, is engaged to drive the principal's truck, not to speak for him; hence a
statement by the driver that he was speeding is not a party admission of his employer-principal, and can not be admitted against the employer under a party admissions theory.
Id. at § 57, p. 198 (footnotes omitted). See also J. WIGMORE, A STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 208 (1935):
In an action for personal injury caused by collision of the plaintiff's motor car with
the defendant's trolley car, the plaintiff offers to show that after the collision the
motorman said to the bystander, "The brake-chain broke just as we were nearing the
other car." Most courts would exclude this.
Id. See also GRAHAM, supra note 81:
At common law, courts apply the traditional agency test in determining admissibility
of statements by agents or servants, i.e., whether the particular statement was authorized by the principal. Since agents or servants are very rarely authorized to make
damaging statements-the truck driver is hired to drive, not talk-common law
courts generally decide that damaging statements are not within the scope of authority, even of relatively high level employees.
Id. at 156.
In Packet Co. v. Clough, 87 U.S. 528, 540 (1874), the Court held that declarations of
defendant's steamboat captain, made two days after plaintiff was injured and attributing
the injury to the negligence of defendant's employees, should not have been admitted:
Declarations of an agent are, doubtless, in some cases admissible against his principal, but only so far as he had authority to make them, and authority to make them is
not necessarily to be inferred from power given to do certain acts. A captain of a
passenger steamer is empowered to receive passengers on board, but it is not necessary to this power that he be authorized to admit that either his principal, or any
servant of his principal, has been guilty of negligence in receiving passengers.
Id.
In Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99, 105 (1886), the Court, dividing 5-4,
held that a train engineer's declaration, made ten to thirty minutes after plaintiff was injured and asserting that the train had then been moving at eighteen miles per hour, should
not have been received:
We are of the opinion that the declaration of the engineer. . . to the witness. . . was
not competent against the defendant for the purpose of proving the rate of speed at
which the train was moving at the time of the accident. . . . Although the speed of
the train was, in some degree, subject to his control, still his authority, in that respect, did not carry with it authority to make declarations or admissions at a subsequent time, as to the manner in which. . . he had performed his duty.
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employee declarations were admissible against the employer as vicarious admissions. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) drastically broadens the
scope of vicarious admissions.
Let's assume that plaintiff was injured in an intersection collision between his car and a delivery truck operated by an employee
of defendant. Liability turns on which vehicle entered the intersection on a green light and which ran a red light. Let's assume, too,
that diversity jurisdiction is available. The state court available to
the litigants retains the traditional restrictive view of vicarious admissions. Plaintiff's counsel has a witness (W) prepared to testify
that a significant time after the collision, 113 but while the truck
driver was still employed by defendant, the truck driver told W
that the truck had run the red light. If the action were tried in the
state court described, W's offered testimony would be excluded as
hearsay. At most, it would be admissible only for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of the truck driver, assuming
that the truck driver testified that plaintiff's car had run the red
light. Under 801(d)(2)(D), W's testimony as to the truck driver's
declaration would be received substantively as a vicarious admission. Almost certainly, plaintiff's counsel would opt for diversity
jurisdiction and achieve the substantive admissibility of W's
testimony.
In Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 86 F. Supp. 255, 277 (W.D. Pa. 1949), rev'd
on other grounds, 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950), the court said:
In order to warrant the proof of admissions by an agent, one or more of the following
facts must exist: It must appear that the agent was specifically authorized to make
them; or his powers must have been such as to constitute him the general representative of the principal having the management of the entire business; or the admissions
must have formed part of the consideration of a contract, or, if they are non-contractual, they must have been part of the res gestae.
Id. The Third Circuit concluded that declarations of employees are not admissible against
the employer where it is not shown that declarants "held such managerial responsibilities
that what they said could be received as admissions against their employers." 183 F.2d at
474.
113. By having the declaration made a significant time after the collision, we make it
unlikely that the declaration would be characterized as an excited utterance "made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event ....
" FED. R. EvID.
803(2). It is possible that the declaration could be considered admissible as a declaration
against the truck driver's interest. However, for that exception to the hearsay rule to apply,
the truck driver would have to be unavailable as a witness at trial. See FED. R. Evi.
804(b)(3). Moreover, the traditional declaration against interest required that the declaration be against the direct pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant; it did not necessarily encompass a declaration "tending to establish a tort liability against the declarant."
FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(4) advisory committee note. Although the declaration against interest
exception is set forth in FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3), the Advisory Committee's Note is numbered 804(b)(4) because of realignment of the exceptions in Rule 804.
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Is that litigation advantage, available because of the availability
of diversity jurisdiction, appropriate? I think it is. The congressional decision manifested by 801(d)(2)(D) is that such employee
declarations constitute "valuable and helpful evidence""', that
should not be lost to the fact finder. Certainly, Congress has the
authority to enact a rule which will assure the availability of such
evidence in federal courts, whether hearing federal or diversity actions, thus enhancing the judicial integrity of such proceedings.
Congress' exercise of that authority does not improperly infringe
any significant state interest. While the state in which the employer-employee relationship existed (the forum state, let us assume), may have a right to regulate that relationship, and while
exclusion of such an employee declaration may constitute an element of such regulation, Congress retains its right to protect the
integrity of judicial proceedings in federal courts. Therefore, notwithstanding the legitimate state interest, there is a sufficient federal interest to justify the rule of evidence enacted by Congress.

XI.

RULE

301

AND PRESUMPTIONS

Rule 301 provides that:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or
meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof
in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the
trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.1 "

I feel obliged to apologize for imposing the totality of the language
of Rule 301 on the reader. At the same time, I feel an obligation to
engage in the imposition because of the less than perfect wording
of the Rule. To me, that wording raises this basic question: In enacting Rule 301, did Congress intend to create a rebuttable presumption 11 6 or a mere permissible inference?"17 I am inclined to
believe that Congress intended to fashion a rebuttable presump114. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) advisory committee note.
115. FED. R. EVID. 301.
116. If plaintiff's evidence of facts A, B, and C generates a rebuttable presumption of
X, and if defendant offers no evidence tending to rebut X, plaintiff would be entitled to a
jury instruction to the effect that, if the jury accepts plaintiffs evidence of facts A, B, and
C, it must accept X. See MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at 973-74.
117. If plaintiff's evidence of facts A, B, and C generates only a permissible inference
of X, and if defendant offers no evidence tending to rebut X, the jury would be instructed
that, even if it accepts plaintiff's evidence of facts A, B, and C, it remains free to accept or
reject X. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 229 (4th ed. 1971).
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tion. Although the Rule explicitly does not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion onto the party against whom the presumption
arises, it does explicitly impose on that party the burden of
presenting rebutting evidence. That "burden" is meaningful only if
Rule 301 is read as creating a rebuttable presumption.
But here's the hooker. The Conference Committee Report states:
Under the Senate amendment [to Rule 301], a presumption is sufficient to
get a party past an adverse party's motion to dismiss made at the end of his
case-in-chief. If the adverse party offers no evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the court will instruct the jury that if it finds the basic facts, it
may presume the existence of the presumed fact ....

The Conference

adopts the Senate amendment.""

It is obvious that a mere permissible inference, as well as a rebuttable presumption, would be "sufficient to get a party past an
adverse party's motion to dismiss made at the end of his case-inchief." And it is only with a permissible inference that the court
would instruct the jury that, absent any rebutting evidence and
even though the jury "finds the basic facts, it may presume the
existence of the presumed fact." In such circumstances, a rebuttable presumption would require an instruction directing the jury
that it must accept the presumed fact.1 1 9 So there we are. The language of the Rule suggests a rebuttable presumption and the Conference Report's use of the word "may" suggests a permissible
inference.
The differences between the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, ultimately resolved by the Conference Committee, had little to do with the distinction between a rebuttable presumption
and a permissible inference. Rather, that dispute involved the effect of a presumption after rebutting evidence is introduced. The
House Committee felt that the presumption continued to be evidence to be considered by the jury, even after rebutting evidence
was received. 120 The Senate Committee favored the "bursting bubble" theory, under which the presumption disappears once rebutting evidence is received, with the jury to consider only evidence
against evidence. 2 1 It was in that context that the Conference Report "adopt[ed] the Senate amendment." Neither the House nor
118.

1974 U.S.
119.

CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, 7099.

(1974) (emphasis added), reprinted in

See supra note 116.

120.

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REP. No. 93-1277,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7055.

121.

Id.

93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
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the Senate Committee directed specific attention to the effect of a
presumption not met with rebutting evidence. It is in those circumstances that the distinction between a rebuttable presumption
and a permissible inference becomes significant. Consequently, I
think Rule 301 should be read as generating a rebuttable presumption, notwithstanding the Conference Report's use of the single
word "may".
There is some, admittedly thin, support for that conclusion in
the Supreme Court's opinion in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine.2 2 In Burdine, the Court held that the plaintiff's evidence created a rebuttable presumption of discrimination by defendant-employer. The effect of that presumption, according to the
Court, was this: "If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of
fact remains in the case."' 2 3 On the other hand, if the employer
1 24
offers evidence "to rebut the presumption of discrimination,
the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff. Those
conclusions of the Court would seem to be entirely consistent with
the express language of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift
the ultimate burden of persuasion and the apparent intent of the
Rule to generate a rebuttable presumption, i.e., one that imposes
on the adverse party a "burden of going forward with evidence to
rebut or meet the presumption." Then why not read Burdine as a
Supreme Court conclusion that Rule 301 generates a rebuttable
presumption, rather than a mere permissible inference? Unfortunately, the Court cited Rule 301 only in a footnote and without
elaboration. 25 Nevertheless, I am inclined to read Burdine as providing some support for the conclusion that Rule 301 was intended
to create a rebuttable presumption. My own inclination, complemented by Burdine and persuasive scholarly support, 2 6 leads me
122.
123.
124.
125.

450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 255 n.8.
126. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 68 (3d ed.
1982); M. GRAIIAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 114-15 (1981).
In Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the court,
explaining the procedural effect of Rule 301, wrote:
The effect of a presumption... is to place upon the opposing party the burden of
establishing the non-existence of that [presumed] fact. The burden on the opposing
party, however, is limited to production of evidence. The burden of persuasionon the
existence of the presumed fact remains throughout on the party invoking the presumption. The [party invoking the presumption] . . .bears the ultimate burden.
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to that conclusion.
But what forum selection opportunities are generated by that
conclusion? It can have no applicability to diversity cases; there,
Rule 302 provides that "the effect of a presumption . . .isdetermined in accordance with State law. 1 27 Therefore, whether or not
counsel utilizes diversity jurisdiction, Rule 301 will not be applicable and the presumption will be treated as a rebuttable presumption or mere permissible inference, depending on state law. But
what about those federal actions for which concurrent state or federal jurisdiction exists, actions like those arising under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act? 128 If an FELA action were brought in
state court and plaintiff relied on res ipsa loquitur to make a legally sufficient liability case against defendant-railroad-employer,
the state court might be free to treat the res ipsa case as generating either a rebuttable presumption or a mere permissible inference of negligence. 29 But if the action were brought in federal
court, and if our conclusion as to the intent of Rule 301 is correct,
that court would be compelled to conclude that the procedural effect of the res ipsa case was that of a rebuttable presumption of
negligence.13 0 In those circumstances, if defendant failed to present
A presumption does not enjoy the status of evidence. If a finding on the evidence is
made that a presumed fact has been effectively rebutted, the presumed fact ceases to
exist. It does not linger on to be weighed against the evidence. If evidence is provided
which falls short of meeting the threshold of rebuttal, the presumed fact retains its
viability.
Id. at 1579 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
127. FED. R. EVID. 302.
128. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). Section 56 provides for concurrent jurisdiction. Other
examples of concurrent jurisdiction exist at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1983) (Jones Act) (see, e.g.,
Baptiste v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 87, 164 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980); American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Ostertag, 582 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. App. 1979); Standard Products, Inc. v.
Patterson, 317 So.2d 376 (Miss. 1975); Springle v. Cottrell Eng. Corp., 40 Md. 267, 391 A.2d
456 (1978)); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1983) (Consumer Credit Protection) (see, e.g., Jakob v.
First Alabama Bank, 361 So.2d 1017 (Ala.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978); Perry v.
American Finance Corp., 372 A.2d 224 (Del. Super. 1977); Household Consumer Discount
Co. v. Vespaziani, 490 Pa. 209, 415 A.2d 689 (1980)); 28 U.S.C. 1333 (1983) (Admiralty:
"saving to suitors" clause ) (see, e.g., Casey v. Palmer Johnson Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D.
Wis. 1981); Pfeiffer v. Weiland, 226 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1975); Hebert v. Diamond M. Co.,
367 So.2d 1210 (La. App. 1978)).
129. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 40, p. 257 (5th ed. 1984).
130. See SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 126, at 67: "We believe that Congress intended that presumptions [whether resting on policy grounds or logic and probability]
would be treated uniformly under Rule 301 .
I..."
Id. Apparently, the applicability of Rule
301 to a res ipsa case in a federal cause of action was overlooked by the court in Wilson v.
United States, 645 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1981): "In this circuit, the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitursimply makes it permissible to draw an inference of negligence
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rebutting evidence, and if the jury accepted plaintiff's basic evidence, the jury would be required to resolve the liability issue in
favor of the plaintiff.
Would that consequence flowing from plaintiff's counsel's decision to sue in federal court be appropriate? Clearly, yes. In addition to the inherent federal interest arising out of the fact that the
action sued on was one created by Congress, there would be the
legitimate concern Congress would have in regulating the procedural effect to be given a presumption in a federal court
proceeding.

XII.

RULE

302

AND PRESUMPTIONS IN DIVERSITY CASES

We have already noted that in diversity cases Rule 302 provides
that "the effect of a presumption . . . is determined in accordance
with State law." '' Consequently, we have determined that in diversity cases there is no opportunity for forum selection as between state and federal court; whichever court is utilized will determine the effect of a presumption pursuant to state law. But
which state's law? Is the state law referred to by Rule 302 invariably to be read as the local law of the forum state or is it to be read
as a reference to the total law of the forum state, conflicts law as
well as local law? Is Klaxon applicable to Rule 302?
We have seen earlier that similar language in Rule 501, providing that in diversity cases privilege issues are to be determined by
state law, has been read by federal courts as requiring recourse to
the conflicts law, as well as the local law, of the forum state.'3 2
Thus, a federal court sitting in State A and exercising diversity
jurisdiction and finding itself confronted with a choice-of-law problem as to a privilege issue, is to resolve that issue precisely as it
would be resolved by the highest appellate court of State A. We
have concluded, too, that since similar language was utilized in
Rule 601, providing that in diversity cases competency issues are
to be determined in accordance with state law, Klaxon is likewise
applicable. 33 Therefore, a federal court sitting in State A and exercising diversity jurisdiction and finding itself confronted with a
choice-of-law problem as to a competency issue, should resolve
from a set of facts. Invocation of the doctrine does not establish a presumption of negligence
. Id.
131. FED. R. EVID. 302.
132. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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that issue precisely as it would be resolved by the highest appellate
court of State A.
The language used in Rule 302 is similar to that utilized by Congress in 501 and 601.134 Consequently, it would seem that a federal
court sitting in State A and exercising diversity jurisdiction and
finding itself confronted with a choice-of-law problem as to a presumption issue, is to resolve that issue precisely as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of State A. Let's fashion a
hypothetical case creating such a problem.
Plaintiff was injured when the car in which he was riding as a
passenger left the traveled portion of the roadway, overran the
berm, and crashed into a tree in State B. Defendant was the car
operator. Plaintiff can acquire no further information concerning
the cause of the crash. Plaintiff's counsel contemplates presenting
the available evidence and asserting that it creates a res ipsa case
against defendant. Defendant's counsel contemplates presenting no
liability evidence at trial. Plaintiff is a citizen of State A, defendant a citizen of State B. Defendant is vulnerable to jurisdiction in
either State A or State B and diversity jurisdiction is available.
Both State A and State B would conclude that plaintiff's evidence
creates a legally sufficient case of negligence through res ipsa loquitur. However, State A treats such a case as generating a rebuttable presumption of negligence; State B treats it as generating
only a permissible inference of negligence. Therefore, in State A,
plaintiff's evidence, if believed by the jury and unrebutted by defendant, would require the jury to resolve the liability issue in
favor of plaintiff. On the other hand, in State B, plaintiff's evidence, even if believed by the jury and unrebutted by defendant,
would permit the jury to resolve the liability issue either way.
Plaintiff's counsel elects to utilize diversity jurisdiction and to
bring the action in a federal district court sitting in State A. At the
close of plaintiff's case-in-chief, defendant's counsel asserts that he
intends to present no rebutting evidence as to liability. Counsel for
the plaintiff then requests that the court instruct the jury that, if
the jury believes plaintiff's evidence, the jury must find for plaintiff (as required by State A's local law). Counsel for defendant objects to the requested instruction and submits a requested instruction telling the jury that, even if the jury believes plaintiff's
evidence, the jury is free to resolve the liability issue either way (as
provided by State B's local law).
134.

See supra text accompanying notes 6 & 37.

1985

Conflicts Law and Rules of Evidence

609

Under Rule 302, the court is to resolve the issue of the effect of a
presumption "in accordance with State law." Under our reading of
Rule 302, reasoning by analogy from the similar language employed in Rules 501 and 601, the court is to resolve the issue precisely as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of
State A. Looking to the opinions of that court, the diversity court
finds that State A has embraced interest analysis as the method
for resolving choice-of-law problems, but has not heretofore resolved this particular issue. Consequently, the diversity court, using interest analysis, must attempt to arrive at that result which
the federal court believes would be achieved by the State A court.
The diversity court could conclude that there are two reasons for
State A's local law treating a res ipsa case resting on such facts as
generating a rebuttable presumption of negligence: (1) to attempt
to regulate the conduct of the operator of the car by letting him
know that, if a passenger is so injured, the driver will be held liable
unless he can produce evidence rebutting liability, in the hope that
this will encourage drivers with passengers to drive more carefully
and better protect the physical and economic integrity of their passengers, and (2) to attempt to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings in State A by encouraging the driver to present any evidence he may have, thus by "smoking out" such evidence to assure
35
that the fact finder has all the relevant evidence available.'
Does either of those reasons for State A's local law convert into a
significant interest on the part of that state in having its law applied? Since plaintiff is domiciled in State A, his physical and economic integrity are of critical concern to that state; therefore, the
conduct-regulating reason for State A's local law would seem to
convert. 136 Since the trial is in State A, the second reason for that
law, preserving the integrity of judicial proceedings in State A,
may convert. As we have noted earlier, a state law based on a state
desire to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings in that state,
may or may not convert with regard to a diversity case in that
state. However, the diversity court could conclude that the spirit,
if not the letter, of Klaxon suggests such convertibility where, as
here, there is no countervailing federal concern." 7 In that case,
135. See KEETON & OWEN, supra note 129, at 259: "The partial survival of such an
. . . attitude . . . may have been due to a more or less conscious policy of requiring the
defendant to produce evidence explaining the accident or pay." Id.
136. See supra note 56.
137. See supra text accompanying note 16 for discussion of the potential applicability
of Klaxon, and text accompanying note 87, supra, for discussion of countervailing state and
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both of the reasons underlying State A's local law, giving the res
ipsa case the effect of a rebuttable presumption of negligence,
would convert into significant interests on the part of State A in
having its law applied to this case.
What is the reason for State B's local law, treating the res ipsa
case as generating only a permissible inference of negligence? State
B may feel that, where plaintiff-passenger presents no direct evidence of negligence, it would be a perversion of the judicial process
to compel a verdict for plaintiff if the jury accepts plaintiff's circumstantial evidence. In other words, State B believes that limiting the res ipsa case to a permissible inference of negligence preserves the integrity of the judicial process in State B. Since the
case is not being tried in State B, the reason for that state's local
law does not convert into a significant interest on the part of State
B in having its law applied to this case. The case presents a false
conflict; State A is the only state having a significant interest in
the application of its law. The diversity court sitting in State A,
therefore, would be virtually certain to conclude that (1) the highest appellate court of State A would apply its local law, thus, (2)
under Rule 302 and Klaxon the diversity court must do the same,
hence (3) the court would grant plaintiff's counsel's requested jury
instruction.
If plaintiff's counsel had brought the action in a diversity court
sitting in State B, that state's concern with the integrity of judicial
proceedings in that state may have converted. State A's concern
with the physical and economic integrity of the plaintiff, a State A
resident, would still have converted. Thus, the diversity court in
State B would have been confronted with a true conflict: each state
would have a significant interest in the application of its local law.
In those circumstances, the diversity court sitting in State B could
have concluded that (1) the highest appellate court of State B
would apply its own local law, (2) such an application would be
constitutionally permissible and, therefore, binding on the diversity court, and (3) for those reasons, the defendant's requested instruction should be given to the jury. Obviously, plaintiff's counsel's decision to bring the action in a diversity court sitting in State
A, rather than one sitting in State B, made it considerably more
likely that the plaintiff-favoring instruction concerning the effect
of the presumption would be given.
Is that an acceptable advantage flowing from counsel's selection
federal concerns with preserving judicial integrity.
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of forum? I think it must be. In Rule 302, Congress saw fit to avoid
a forum selection advantage as between state and federal courts in
diversity cases. Congress left intact the inherent forum selection
opportunity where defendant is vulnerable to jurisdiction in two or
more states, and to diversity jurisdiction in those states. There can
be no impropriety in a congressional decision that leaves unchanged disparities in state law that may arise in a diversity case
or in a congressional determination that the interests of the states
involved, even when conflicting, are superior to any federal interest
in such an issue.
XIII.

RULE

803(4)

AND STATEMENTS MADE FOR DIAGNOSIS OR
TREATMENT

Rule 803(4) treats as exceptions to the hearsay rule
"[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment
and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain,
or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment."' 138 Perhaps the first significant factor about Rule
803(4) is its use of the disjunctive or between "diagnosis" and
"treatment." By the purposeful use of or, Congress concluded that
medically pertinent statements made to nontreating medical personnel, as well as such statements made to treating medical personnel, should be admissible over a hearsay objection.13 9 "Conventional doctrine ha[d] excluded from the hearsay exception, as not
within its guarantees of truthfulness, statements to a physician
1 40
consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify.
Under the traditional view.. the nontreating physician-witness
could testify to such statements to demonstrate the basis of his
opinion but those statements so identified were not substantively
4
admissible.1 1
Is there a significant difference between the "conventional" doctrine and the choice made by Congress? The Advisory Committee's
Note to 803(4) states that "[tlhe distinction . . . called for [by the
conventional doctrine] was one most unlikely to be made by ju138. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
139. "The same guarantee of trustworthiness extends to statements ... made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment [as applies to statements made for purposes of diagnosis and
treatment]." FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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ries. ' 142 That language suggests that one reason for the change effected by Congress was its recognition that the older view was
more ignored than followed by juries anyway. Of course, that implies little distinction between the older and newer views. Still,
under Rule 803(4) the federal district court judge is not even to
instruct the jury to disregard as substantive evidence such extrajudicial statements testified to by a nontreating expert witness. That
would seem to lend an enhanced-and under the Rule wholly appropriate-certainty that the jury will indeed consider such statements substantively. And that, in turn, means that the jury is
likely to hear the patient's symptoms as substantive evidence at
least three times: once when the patient testifies, again when the
treating physician testifies, and once more when the nontreating
physician testifies. That repetition, unencumbered by an admonition limiting the admissibility of the nontreating physician's testimony, seems likely to generate jury familiarity with, and ultimately more ready acceptance of, the patient's symptoms. If
patient is plaintiff, plaintiff's counsel is sure to welcome that likelihood. Counsel can assure that likelihood simply by utilizing diversity jurisdiction, if it is available, and avoiding the "conventional"
doctrine that may subsist in the available state court. Is that advantage, available because of the existence of diversity jurisdiction,
appropriate? Clearly, yes. Whether Congress chose the path it did
because of a belief that it accurately reflected what juries were doing notwithstanding contrary limiting instructions or because of a
belief that such statements made to a nontreating expert were acceptably trustworthy, its decision was one aimed at preserving the
integrity of the judicial process in federal courts hearing both federal and diversity cases. When the forum is a federal court, Congress has the authority to act for such a purpose.
There is a second significant factor to be noted with regard to
Rule 803(4). Under that exception to the hearsay rule, "the statement need not have been made to a physician. Statements to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family
might be included. ' 143 Moreover, the language of the Rule does not
require that the statement have been made by the patient. The
Rule would apply to a statement made by a knowledgeable relative
of an unconscious patient to a physician, hospital attendant, or
ambulance driver, so long as the statement was reasonably perti142. Id.
143. Id.
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nent to diagnosis or treatment. That broad applicability of the
Rule goes beyond the conventional view as it existed not only in
some state courts but in federal courts as well.
In Arnold v. Loose, " ' wrongful death and survival actions were
brought against the personal representative of a deceased car operator. Plaintiff's evidence indicated that the car had been operated
negligently. Defendant sought to negate negligent driving by the
testimony of the orthopedic surgeon who had treated defendant's
decedent in a hospital emergency room. The orthopedic surgeon
was prepared to testify that decedent had lapsed into a diabetic
coma before the collision. The Third Circuit, dividing 2-1, concluded that the offered testimony was not admissible. The majority's conclusion was based on two concerns: (1) the orthopedic surgeon failed to demonstrate adequate qualifications with regard to
diabetes, and (2) his opinion was based in part on a medical history received from the unconscious patient's wife.' 4 5 The dissent
was unpersuaded by either concern. We can direct our attention to
the second concern only. The majority was troubled by the impropriety of the expert's having based his opinion in part on the extrajudicial declarations of the patient's spouse. The dissent noted
that, since the expert would quite naturally rely on the medical
history provided by the wife in his efforts to save the patient's life,
he should be permitted to rely on that same medical history in
forming an opinion as a witness. Under Rule 803(4), the dissenting
opinion, persuasive when written, would probably become the
court's opinion. That conclusion is corroborated by the Advisory
Committee's Note to 803(4): "This position is consistent with the
provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which expert testimony is
based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily
relied upon by experts in the field.' 4 6 The Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 703147 states:
Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information
from numerous sources and of considerable variety, including statements by
patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and
other doctors, hospital records, and X-rays. Most of them are admissible in
evidence, but only with the expenditure of substantial time in producing
and examining various authenticating witnesses. The physician makes lifeand-death decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, expertly per144. 352 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1965).
145. Id. at 962-63; 965 (dissenting opinion).
146. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note.
147. FED. R. EVID. 703.
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formed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial
purposes.""

Under Rule 703, the expert's opinion would be admissible, even
assuming the substantive inadmissiblity of the medical history provided by the patient's wife. Under 803(4), that medical history itself would be substantively admissible.
Suppose a similar case arose today. Suppose, too, that plaintiff's
counsel elected not to utilize the available diversity jurisdiction.
Instead, he brings the action in state court in a state retaining the
"conventional" doctrine reflected in Arnold. Then defendant's
counsel might be well advised to remove the case to federal court,
thus assuring the applicability of Rules 703 and 803(4) and the admissibility of the exculpating expert testimony and the extrajudicial declarations of patient's wife. Would that litigation advantage
arising out of the availability of diversity jurisdiction be appropriate? Certainly. Rules 702 and 803(4) reflect congressional decisions
as to the trustworthiness of evidence. They represent congressional
efforts to enhance the integrity of proceedings in federal courts,
whether there as federal causes of action or diversity cases. Consequently, their applicability to a contemporary Arnold analog would
be entirely appropriate.
XIV. RULE 803(18) AND LEARNED TREATISES
Under Rule 803(18), statements in a learned treatise constitute
an exception to the hearsay rule
[t]o the extent [that such treatise is] called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination
• . . [if such treatise is] established as a reliable authority by the testimony
or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be
4
received as exhibits.1 9

To me, that exception to the hearsay rule suggests one method of
ameliorating what was once a nearly insurmountable obstacle and
continues to be a problem in some medical malpractice cases: establishing a professional standard inconsistent with defendant's
conduct, given the reluctance of some physicians to testify for
plaintiffs in such cases. 150 If plaintiff's counsel is lucky enough to
148.
149.
150.
U.L.

REV.

FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note.
FED. R. EvID. 803(18).

See Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16
158 (1966). See also Graham v. Sisco, 248 Ark. 6, 449 S.W.2d 949 (1970):

CATH.
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find a medical treatise asserting such a standard, 151 and if the author's qualifications are common knowledge "within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court," 1 5 the language of 803(18) suggests
that the excerpt may come in substantively, even absent a live expert witness willing to qualify the author. The Advisory Committee's Note, however, states a significant limitation to that
suggestion:
The rule avoids the danger of misunderstanding and misapplication [of such
an excerpt] by limiting the use of treatises as substantive evidence to situations in which an expert is on the stand and available to explain and assist in the application of the treatise if desired."'

Apparently, then, while the court may take judicial notice of the
author's qualifications, the excerpt will be admitted only if an expert is on the stand to "explain" the excerpt's esoterica. Of course,
plaintiff's counsel could call defendant physician as on cross-examination, but, given a litigant's sense of self-interest and adequate
preparation by his counsel, it seems unlikely that defendant will
explain the excerpt in a manner calculated to make plaintiff's case
legally sufficient. Apparently, Rule 803(18) will not permit the
treatise to eliminate the need for a live expert witness. However, if
plaintiff's counsel can find one duly qualified expert willing to explain the excerpt in the manner desired by plaintiff, the excerpt, so
explained, could make the plaintiff's case legally sufficient. Moreover, if plaintiff has a live expert willing to (1) establish a professional standard inconsistent with defendant's conduct, and (2) explain the excerpt in a corroborative manner, the plaintiff will have
[An important point of policy is involved. It is a matter of common knowledge, often
mentioned in judicial opinions and other authorities, that the plaintiff in a medical
malpractice case is often unable to find a medical expert willing to testify against a
fellow physician .... Such a conspiracy of silence, as it is usually called, would allow
the most grossly negligent practitioner to avoid even the simple duty of making his
own explanation, under oath, of how the plaintiff happened to be injured.
Id. at 951.
See also Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972):
Another court took into consideration the patient's difficulty in finding a physician
who would breach the "community of silence" by testifying against the interest of one
of his professional colleagues .... Today, we think it is obvious that while the court
can appoint an expert, there is no compulsion on the part of the appointee to serve,
particularly if he thinks his court appearance may jeopardize the renewal of his malpractice insurance or result in an increase in the premium paid by his colleagues.
Id. at 624, 295 A.2d at 687.
151. Cf. Cinis v. Post, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 859, 304 N.E.2d 207 (1973); Tart v. McGann,
697 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1982).
152.
153.

FED. R. EVID. 201(b).

FED. R. EvID. 803(18) advisory committee note (emphasis added).
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two pieces of substantive evidence of defendant's negligence. Given
the parade of expert witnesses in the defense case likely to justify
defendant's conduct, that "extra" piece of substantive evidence
may make it somewhat easier for the jury to find malpractice.
How does all of that differ from the way in which a state court
would react to plaintiff's offer in evidence of the treatise's excerpt?
Well, some states have statutes aimed at achieving a similar evidentiary result; 54 but some states do not. In those latter states,
plaintiff's counsel may find that his use of the treatise is limited to
efforts to impeach defendant's experts, and not admissible as substantive evidence. If plaintiff is unable to make a legally sufficient
case, because of the absence of an expert willing to establish a
plaintiff-favoring standard, the limited impeachment effect will be
moot. Even if plaintiff can make a legally sufficient case, because of
the availability of one willing expert, the limited impeachment
value of the treatise may not be sufficient to persuade the jury to
accept plaintiff's asserted professional standard. Therefore, given
the availability of diversity jurisdiction and the existence of a
favorable treatise, plaintiff's counsel may very well elect to sue in
federal court and avail his client of the benefit of Rule 803(18).
Is that litigation benefit, available because of the existence of
diversity jurisdiction, appropriate? I believe the answer is clearly
yes. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803(18) states that
"[the foundation [of the rule] is that the hearsay objection must
be regarded as unimpressive when directed against treatises since a
high standard of accuracy is engendered by various factors: the
treatise is written primarily and impartially for professionals, subject to scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputation of
the writer at stake. 1 5 5 That rationale represents a conclusion that
such treatises are sufficiently trustworthy to be read into evidence,
and Congress had the authority to conclude that, for that very reason, their being read into evidence poses no threat to, in fact, enhances, the integrity of the federal judicial process. Therefore, the
potential advantage offered by the existence of diversity jurisdiction would appear to be entirely appropriate.

XV.

RULE

804(b)(2)

AND "DYING DECLARATIONS"

Perhaps one of the most dramatic changes effected by the Fed154. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 79(C) (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.255
(1971); ME. R. EvID. 803(18) (1976).
155. Fed. R. Evid. 803(18) advisory committee note.
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eral Rules of Evidence is the broadened admissibility of declarations made in contemplation of death. Traditionally, such declarations were admissible only in homicide prosecutions.1 56 Under Rule
804(b)(2), "a statement made by a declarant while believing that
his death was imminent, [and] concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death,

' 157

is ad-

missible "[i]n a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or
proceeding."15 8 Moreover, the unavailability of declarant, a condition precedent to admissibility, "is not limited to death."' 59 Unavailability will be satisfied if declarant "is unable to be present or
to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical
or mental illness or infirmity .... "160
The possibilities for utilization of that dramatically broadened
"dying declaration" exception to the hearsay rule are substantial.
In any wrongful death action in which decedent, speaking in extremis, made a statement tending to inculpate the ultimate defendant or exculpate himself, the statement would be admissible. In a
personal injury action in which the gravely injured victim, believing that death was imminent, made a statement tending to inculpate the ultimate defendant or exculpate himself, the statement
would be admissible if declarant-plaintiff, although alive at the
time of trial, was then physically or mentally unable to testify. 61
Let's examine the efficacy of the broadened "dying declaration"
exception in the factual context of a pre-Rules case brought in
supra note 14, at § 283.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
Id. (emphasis added).
159. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee note.
160. FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(4) and FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee note.
161. Surprisingly, I have not found a single post-Rules case in which "a statement
made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent," FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2),
has been received in evidence in a civil action. Apparently, my experience has not been
unique. In all of the treatises and casebooks noting the applicability of Rule 804(b)(2) to
civil actions, no such case is cited. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, J. MANSFIELD, N. ABRAMS & M.
BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 842 n.5 (7th ed. 1983); E. GREEN & C. NESSON,
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 343-45 (1983); EPSTEIN & SALTZBURG, supra
note 63, at 295; GRAHAM, supra note 81, at 264; LAMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 81, at
482-85; E. CLEARY & J. STRONG, EVIDENCE, CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 662-63 (3d ed. 1981);
C. MCCORMICK, F. ELLIOT & J. SUTTON, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 814 n.2 (5th
ed. 1981); LILLY, supra note 26, at 258-59.
In Lowe v. General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1980), wrongful death actions
arose out of the deaths of Mrs. Elva Fulford and her daughter, Mrs. Lou Anne Lowe. Id. at
1375. The court wrote: "A witness to the accident, J.C. Champion, was told by Mrs. Fulford,
as she lay injured in the automobile, that the car had suddenly become impossible to steer."
Id. at 1376. The court, however, did not indicate the basis of admissibility of the testimony
of witness Champion.
156.
157.
158.

MCCORMICK,

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:559

state court. In Cummings v. Illinois Central Railroad,162 decedent
sustained a fatal work-connected injury. A wrongful death action
was brought against the employer-railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.163 Under the Act, there is concurrent jurisdiction as between state and federal courts.""4 Plaintiff's counsel
elected to sue in state court. Decedent had died from burns he received while starting a fire at work. Plaintiff's theory of liability
was that defendant had negligently permitted gasoline to be stored
in a can intended for kerosene, and that decedent had unknowingly used the gasoline to start the fire. Defendant asserted that
the gasoline used to start the fire had not come from a container
maintained by it. A witness called by the plaintiff testified to a
purported dying declaration made by decedent indicating that the
gasoline had come from a kerosene can maintained by defendant.
Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the appellate court,
which concluded that the dying declaration exception was not
available in civil cases.
If the same case were to arise today, and if plaintiff's counsel
opted for federal court, the decedent's declaration, assuming it to
have been a dying declaration, would be admissible. Would that
litigation advantage, arising from the FELA's grant of concurrent
jurisdiction and counsel's election to sue in federal court, be appropriate? Certainly. First, FELA actions are federal causes of action,
so the inherent federal interest is manifest. Second, the broadened
availability of the dying declaration exception in federal courts is
the product of a determination that "the theory of admissibility
[underlying the common law exception] applied equally in civil
cases .

. . . ":11

"While the original religious justification for the

exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the
years, it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures are present."1 6 Congress concluded that those pressures provide a sufficient basis of trustworthiness to justify the broadened
admissibility of statements made in contemplation of death. And
that congressional determination, that the admissibility of such
statements in civil litigation will not adversely affect the integrity
of the judicial process, provides a wholly acceptable basis for the
broadened admissibility in federal courts.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

364 Mo. 868, 269 S.W.2d 111 (1954).
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
Id. at § 56.
FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee note.
Id.
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How about diversity cases? In any wrongful death action or in
any personal injury action where the broadened admissibility
would be applicable, a declaration made by the victim in contemplation of death is likely to have a significant impact on the fact
finder, judge or jury. In some cases, the declaration could make the
difference between a legally sufficient case or a directed verdict for
the defendant. If the available state court would apply the traditional dying declaration rule and exclude the declaration, counsel
for the plaintiff would do well to opt for diversity jurisdiction, thus
assuring admissibility of the declaration under Rule 804(b)(2).
Would that evidentiary advantage,' available because of diversity
jurisdiction, be appropriate? Of course. Even in a diversity case,
Congress has a significant interest in determining what would and
what would not adversely affect the integrity of the federal judicial
process. As noted above, the broadened admissibility of statements
made in contemplation of death represents a congressional determination that such statements are sufficiently trustworthy that
their receipt in evidence in civil actions poses no threat to the integrity of the judicial process. Indeed, Rule 804(b)(2) suggests a
congressional conclusion that receiving such statements in civil actions will enhance the integrity of the judicial process by affording
the fact finder additional trustworthy evidence.
XVI.

CONCLUSION

Galileo's telescope had a magnification of thirty,"0 7 hardly more
than that of a child's first telescope today. That isn't said to denigrate Galileo's accomplishment in fashioning his telescope and certainly not to denigrate his genius in recognizing the significance of
what he observed. Rather, it is said to emphasize his extraordinary
perception; from his (by today's standards) limited observations,
he was able to revolutionize man's conception of the solar system
in which he lives. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, perceptive counsel had significant opportunities for discriminating forum selection aimed at serving his client's cause.
With the Federal Rules of Evidence, the opportunities have been
magnified significantly, and, with those enlarged opportunities, the
capacity of counsel to serve his client's cause and the responsibility
of the court to assure the legitimacy of the advantages sought,
have been enlarged significantly. It has been the purpose of this
article to attempt to assist counsel and the courts in performing
167. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 204.
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those functions. If both functions are fulfilled with discrimination
and acumen, there is unlikely to be any affront to the "prejudice of
the establishment. ' "68

168.

Id.

